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THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

PREFACE
The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Senor Javier Peres de Cuellar, 
once commented that the Anglo-Argentine dispute over the Falkland Islands could 
be resolved in ten minutes if only the two sides were willing. Unfortunately 
neither Britain nor Argentina has demonstrated the flexibility In Its 
negotiating stance necessary to reach a mutually acceptable accommodation. 
Consequently, the conflict has perpetuated over 150 years* Chapter One looks at 
the long and tortuous history of these Islands, beginning with their discovery 
and subsequent colonisation attempts by France, Spain, and Britain. After Spain 
abandoned the Islands in the early 1800s, Argentina assumed her title* At the 
same time, Britain sought to reassert her own sovereignty claim* Chapter One 
traces the history of these competing sovereignty claims up to the 1982 outbreak 
of hostilities* The intensity and duration of this historic rivalry Impinges 
directly on current attempts to find a solution to the Falklands dispute*
Chapter Two chronicles the course of the 1982 Campaign, beginning with the 
events on South Georgia Island that foreshadowed the larger conflict of 
April-June, 1982* Chapter Two also follows the search for a negotiated 
settlement in the time prior to direct military conflict* Finally, the costs 
and damages Incurred by each side are assessed In the aftermath of the 
Campaign*
In his 1968 book Argentina, H«S* Ferns described with astounding accuracy 
and prescience the factors which could precipitate an escalation of the 
Anglo-Argentine dispute Into armed conflict:
If the problem of the Falkland-Halvlnas Islands leads to tragedy.
vl
the disaster will be a prime instance of the effects of 
non-communication ail round; a national dilemma rendered lethal 
by separate and total ignorance*
Chapter Three analyzes the mlsjudgments and misunderstandings which lead to the 
complete break-down of conflict deterrence. The British government erred both 
in failing to consider how its Falkland#* policies would be perceived in 
Argentina and in wholly disregarding the qualitative change in Argentina*# 
approach to the Falkland# dispute. Argentina, for its part, both critically 
underestimated Britain's commitment to the Islands and seriously miscalculated 
what the international reaction would be to an invasion. Thus, erroneous 
assumptions and faulty intelligence assessments combined to Increase drastically 
the likelihood of hostilities erupting.
Chapter Four traces the frustrating course of negotiations and attempts at 
a normalization of relations since the end of armed conflict in June, 1982. The 
almost complete lack of progress in restoring relations and reducing tensions 
reflects the fundamental lncompatability of the two governments; approaches to 
the negotiation process. Firstly, Britain considers the self-determination of 
the Islanders to be the crux of the dispute, while Argentina belioves 
sovereignty is the central issue to be resolved. Secondly, Britain insists that 
talks can only cover the normalization of relations, while Argentina Insists 
that negotiations which fail to address the sovereignty dispute are pointless.
The prospect for resolving this dilemma Is the bifurcation of negotiations, 
where one set of talks would address the normalization of relations while the 
other would allow for discussion of the sovereignty dispute. Still, the 
prospects for Improved relations in the near future are slim. The current 
governments in Buenos Aires and, especially, In London have invested too much 
political rhetoric to allow adequate flexibility in negotiations.
The last chapter—Chapter Five—evaluates the feasibility of a variety of
vii
Long-term options for the Islands* The possible solutions fell into three 
distinct categories: status quo options> internationalisation of the dispute,
and shared sovereignty* The status qu^ schemes (maintaining the status quo, 
integration, free association, and associated statehood) all prove 
unsatisfactory because they Ignore, rather than resolve, the dispute at hand*
The various means of internetionallzatlng the conflict (providing guarantees for 
independence, transforming the Islands into a military base, creating a South 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, forming a tripartite government, incorporating the 
Islands in the Antarctic Treaty, arbitration, mediation, and forming a Truat) 
ignore the claims of either self-determination or sovereignty or both* Still, 
incorporation in the Antarctic Treaty does appear to be a viable long-term 
solution to the Anglo-Argentine dispute over the Dependencies, but not over the 
Falkland Islands themselves* Of the three categories, the shared sovereignty 
options best address the core of the Anglo-Argentine dispute (that is, 
abandonment, condominium, alternating sovereignty, the Andorra Solution, 
sovereignty transfer with guarantee, and leaseback)* Of these schemes, 
leaseback appears as the most viable option and the one most likely to garner 
support from all Involved parties (Britons, Argentines, and Islanders)*
However, the leaseback would have to be supplemented by a buy-out option for 
those Islanders who adamantly refuse to live under Argentine rule* Support for 
this option is growing among ail the relevant parties* However, such a 
substantive resolution of the Anglo-Argentine dispute can only be achieved after 
a normalization of relations. For the time being, the main task is to get 
involved parties to sit down at a negotiating table with their minds open to 
compromise*
viii
CHAPTER 1 :
History of Conflict
Introduction
The Falkland* Campaign1 of April-Juno 1982 pitted great Britain—a Western 
democracy with an undeniably Eurocentric strategic orientation—against 
Argentina—a developing country under military rule—in what could be described 
as an anachronistic struggle over an obscure colonial territory* To the outside 
world, it seemed almost ludicrous that Britain and Argentina would expend such 
effort and resources disputing the possession of, as Samiel Johnson once 
described it,
••.an island thrown aside from human use, stormy in winter and 
barren in summer; an island which not the southern savages have 
dignified with habitation; where a garrison must he kept in a 
state that contemplates with envy the exiles of Siberia...^
Yet, the 1982 conflict was not the first time that the Falkland Islands were the 
object of hostilities. Throughout their history, disputes over possession of 
these islands have involved not jtiBt Britain and Argentina, but also Spain, 
France, tbe United States, and Germany* An awareness of the Falkland Islands' 
complex history is essential if one is to understand tbe contemporary 
conundrum*
Tbe Falkland Islands are actually an archipelago of approximately 12,000 
square kilometers,^ composed of two large islands and about 200 smaller 
islands** The two large islands are the East and West Faiklands (referred to as
1
2Soledad And Oran Malvina, respectively, by the Argentinians); these two islands 
are separated by Falkland Sound (the Strait of San Carlos). The archipelago Is 
situated about 300 miles southwest of the South American mainland and 250 miles 
from the Straits of Magellan. Ceographical 1y, the Islands' surface is rocky and 
hilly, with scattered grasslands, but few trees. The 1980 census revealed a 
population of 1,813 that is essentially British in origin. The mainstay of the 
economy is sheep farming (the island is home to some 650,000 sheep).* The 
Islands are administered locally by a crown-appointed Governor (Sir Rex Hunt), 
an Executive Council (6 members), and a Legislative Council (8 members).
The_ Dependencies
Before considering the history of the Falkland Islands themselves, a 
cursory examination of the Falkland Island Dependencies is worthwhile. The 
Falkland Island Dependencies comprise South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands, 
the Shag Rocks and the Clerke Rocks. These islands, actually, are British 
dependencies, but they are administered through the Falkland Islands' government 
as an expedient. The Argentinians include these Dependencies in their assertion 
of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, although the legitimacy of the claim 
to the Falklands' Dependencies is much more doubtful than is the claim to their 
Falklands themselves. While the Argentines have claimed sovereignty over the 
Falkland Islands since 1811, they did not assert a similar claim with regard to 
the Dependencies until 1937. Further, until the 1982 conflict, the Argentine 
government had never settled on any of the Dependencies; whereas the British 
have continuously occupied South Georgia since 1909. Thus, he Argentine claim 
to the Dependencies is much more tenuous than is their claim to the Falkland 
Islands alone.
Discovery
3The history of the Falkland Islands is subject to a variety of 
Interpretations and this confusion extends back as far as the question of 
discovery.^ Because the physical characteristics of the Islands offered little 
to entice the numerous explorers who traveled the South Atlantic in the 16th and 
17th centuries, the title of discoverer is attributed on the evidence of a first 
sighting rather than on an actual landing. The first possible sighting of the 
Islands may have occurred during Amerigo Vespucci's third voyage (1501-2) when, 
on the 7th of April, he sailed in the general vicinity of the Falklands (53 
degrees south latitude). Vespucci claims: "...we sighted new land, about 20 
leagues of which we skirted; and we found it all barren coast; and we saw in it 
neither harbor nor inhabitants."7 Magellan, for his 1520 expedition, and Friar 
Francisco de la Ribera, for hia 1540 expedition in Incognita, have also been 
credited with the first sighting of the Islands. Unfortunately, che inaccuracy 
and infrequency of navigational records during this period preclude a scientific 
determination of the true discoverer of the Falkland Islands. While many 
Argentines credit the Inc^jnitja expedition with discovery,* the British 
acknowledge their own explorers—John Davis in 1592 and Richard Hawkins in 
1597—as the true discoverers of the Falkland Islands. While Davis, if indeed 
he saw the Islands, made little note or observation of them, Hawkins did sight 
some territory—believed by the British to be the Falklands—and named it 
Hawkins" Maiden-Land (after Queen Elisabeth I). Again, the validity of these 
claims rests upon imprecise navigational records. The 159ft voyage of the Dutch 
explorer Sebald de Weert is generally conceded by all sides to have sighted the 
Islands, although they continue to dispute whether this constituted an original 
discovery or merely a rediscovery.
Throughout the 1600s, the Islands were visited by numerous parties of
4sailors and pirates, and especially were frequented by French sailors from St, 
Halo—from whence the name Halouines (and thus the hlspanlsat ion, Malvinas) 
derives. In his 1690 visit to the Islands, the British Captain John Strong 
named the sound separating the two large Islands Falkland Sound (after VIf >unt 
Falkland, the Treasurer of the Navy) and the name Falkland soon came to he 
applied to the Islands as well.
Although the question of discovery continues to be disputed, the issue is 
essentially moot as far as the right of sovereignty is concerned. Unless 
discovery Is supplemented hy actual occupation, claims of discovery alone do not 
confer sovereignty.
Discovery alone,..without a subsequent effective display of state 
functions over the new land, was generally understood to confer 
only an Inchoate title which, in practice, represented only an 
option or temporary ban to occupation hy another state,••.(An)
Inchoate title of discovery is required to be completed within a 
reasonable period of time by effective occupation.•.(or) the 
Inchoate title could perish.^
Yet, neither Spain nor Britain made an effort to occupy the Islands for over 150 
years—which clearly surpasses the ’reasonable period of time” restriction.
While the official status of the Islands was to remain in limbo, the rocky 
shores were utilised as a haven for wayfaring sailors from many nations.
The Falklands and Imperial Strategy
Although the Falkland Islands may have been considered relatively valueless 
during the 1600s, as Britain's imperial naval strategy developed during the 
eighteenth century, the potential value of the Falklands became apparent.
Whereas both previous and subsequent empires (e.g. Roman, Napoleonic) 
concentrated on the consolidation of land mass, the British empire was to become 
a collection of islands and continental outposts—with a few significant
5exceptions (e.g. India). The master plan of the empire was not tnatv through 
the sea, Britain would forge an empire* Rather, through its empire, Britain 
Intended to dominate the seas.
Let us In God's name leave off our attempts against the .terra 
fIrma. The natural situation of Islands seems not to consort 
with conquests of that ,#ind. England alone a Is just empire. 
Or, when we would enlar, ourselves, let It be that way we can, 
and to which it seems the eternal Providence hath destined us, 
which is by the sea.*0
Followi*;;* his 1740 expedition around the Horn, Admiral Lord George Anson 
advocated the acquisition of a base south of Brasil on either the Pepys or the 
Falkland Islands. Anson felt that such a settlement was
•••necessary to the success of.•.future expeditions against the 
coast of Chile, and as of such use and Importance that it would 
produce many advantages in peace, and in war would make us 
masters of the South Sea.**
The 1748 Expedition
In order to Investigate this proposal, the British sought to dispatch an 
expedition, ostensibly, for the purposes of exploration in 1748. But the 
Spanish Court was quick to protest that such actions would be
...a direct violation of the last peace (the Treaty of 
Aix-la-Chapelle),•..an act inconsistent with amicable intentions, 
and contrary to the professions of mutual kindness which then 
passed between Spain and England.**
The Spanish feared that the expedition was not merely for purposes of 
exploration, but, Instead, would Include the occupation of territory In the 
region. Fhe Spanish were aware of Anson's proposals concerning a base In the 
South Atlantic and, consequently, rejected British assertions that the voyage
6was Intended solely for exploratory purposes. The Spanish felt that: to go
so far only to come hack was no reasonable act...If (the British) left the 
places as (they) found them the voyage was useless; and if (they) took 
possession, it was a hostile armament...."^ Eventually, in the face of these 
Spanish protests, the British cancelled plans for the expedition. Subsequently, 
the Argentinians have cited this incident as a British concession of Spanish 
sovereignty over the Islands. Yet, the right to nettle was never discussed. 
Instead, the issue at hand was the right of Britain to enter the region. This 
right Britain conceded to Spain; however, the British assert that this 
concession did not affect British rights to settle in the region 
subsequently•^
French Occupation
While Britain and Spain wrangled over various regional prerogatives, the 
French, in 1764, effected the first official settlement of the Falkland Islands. 
After erecting a settlement at what is now Port Louis, formAl possession was 
taken of the Islands in the name of the French King Louis V. The Spanish 
government was quick to protest the French Action, fearing that the settlement 
both might pose a threat to Spanish trade and would inspire a similar British 
endeavor. After protracted negotiations, the French agreed to surrender the 
colony in exchange for the payment of a sum of 680,000 livres.^ A Spanish 
colony was established in 1765 on East Falkland. While the French concession is 
frequently cited as evidence of Spanish sovereignty over the Islands, the fact 
that Spain had to purchase the evacuation casts doubt on the strength of the 
Spanish claim.
The Byron Expedition
Meanwhile, the strategic value of the Falkland Islands—having a propitious
7location tor controlling navigation along the South Atlantic trade routes—had 
come to be appreciated in London* The first Lord of the Admiralty* Earl John 
Kgmont described the Falklands as "...the key to the whole Pacific Ocean...It 
will render all our expeditions to those parts most lucrative to ourselves, most 
fatal to Spain and no longer formidable, tedious, or uncertain in a future 
war...."^ Consequently, in the spring of 1764, plans were made for an 
expedition, with Commodore John Byron (grandfather of the poet) directed to call 
at
Mis Majesty's Islands called Falklands.•.situated in the 
Atlantlck Ocean near the Straights of Magellan, in order to make 
better surveys thereof, than had yet been made, and to determine 
a place or places, most proper for a new settlement or 
settlements thereon.^
In January, 1765, Byron landed on West Falkland at Port Egmont (named after the 
First Lord of the Admiralty) and took possession in the lame of King George 111. 
In 1766, a British settlement was established on this same site under the 
command of Captain John McBride.
For three years, this British settlement and the Spanish olony on Fast 
Falkland lived side-by-side with both either unaware of or ignoring the 
existence of the other. This state of affairs continued until November, 1769, 
when Captain Hunt—the Islands' military governor—ordered withdrawn a Spanish 
schooner exploring the western island. Thus, a series of claims and 
counter-claims to possession began which ended with the Spanish explosion—by 
virtue of superior military force—of the Port Egmont settlers in June 1770. 
1771; The Threat of War
"Fortune often delights to dignify what nature has neglected, and that 
renown which cannot be claimed by lntrlnslck excellence or greatnese, la
8Home time a derived from unexpected a c c i d e n t s . S o  wrote Samuel Johnson in 
1771, when it seemed as though Spain, Britain, and perhaps even France might go 
to war over "...the empty sound of an ancient title to a Magellanlck 
rock... Yet, while both aides prepared for war, there was a hesitancy to
initiate hostilities. Both Britain and Spain were uncertain as to what had 
actually transpired on the Islands, as to the validity of their sovereignty 
claims, and even as to whether the Malvinas and the Falklands were one and the 
same)^ Spain, while earnest in its desire to maintain good relations with 
Britain, feared the consequences of allowing an infringement of its territorial 
prerogative in the Americas. Britain on the other hand, sought a redress of the 
humiliation allegedly Inflicted upon the Crown and, with the powerful Lord 
Chatham leading the Opposition, a success for the Government was a political 
imperativei
...it would he comparatively easy for the opposition to 
represent., that the prestige of the country had been materially 
and needlessly diminished.•.such accusations (would).•.probably 
find a ready hearing with a people quite prepared to believe the 
worst of the ministers, and to accept their Incompetence as an 
article of faith; and thus, whether war was declared or peace 
maintained, the future of the administration might he materially 
affected by a trivial encounter on a desert island in a remote 
region of the globe. *
The Resolution of the Dispute
In January of 1771, following extensive and involved negotiations, Britain 
and Spain reached an accord. After attributing the hostile activities of the 
Spanish at Port Egmont to the Independent and unauthorised initiative of the 
Governor of Buenos Aires, the Spanish government disavowed the action and agreed 
to restore Port Egmont to the statue quo ante 10 June 1770—the time of the
Incident* The declaration which announced this, however, emphasised that the
9restoration of Port Egmont to the British "•••cannot nor ought in any wise to 
affect the question of the pr'or right of sovereignty of the Malouine islands, 
otherwise called Falkland Islands.
L  Secre^  Promise
Thus, Britain received satisfaction and had her settlement restored, while 
peace was preserved. But the Spanish insist that there was more to the 
compromise than was explicitly declared* They maintain that, in exchange for 
the restitution of Port Egmont, the British had agreed secretly to abandon the 
settlement later, Lord North supposedly told Frances, the French chargl 
d'affaires in London, who served as an intermediary in the negotiations, that 
"...if Spain would only give satisfaction without condition England would 
abandon the Falklands to them, as she did not desire to make war for the 
i s l a n d s W h e t h e r  any such promise was ever made by the British continues to 
be disputed* While no official documentation has appeared, the fact that, in 
1774, the British did withdraw from the Falkland Islands is seen by many as 
evidence of such a promise and, consequently, of an implicit British concession 
of Spanish sovereignty over the Islands. Yet, the British contend that the 1774 
abandonment was motivated purely by economic considerations and was not a 
concession of sovereignty: "It (the colony) is neither more nor less than a 
small part of an uneconomical naval regulation."^ As evidence, they cite a 
plaque which was left when the colony was abandoned that stated:
Be it known to all nations that the Falkland Islands, with this 
fort, the storehouses, wharfs, harbors, bays and creeks thereunto 
belonging are the sole property of His Most Sacred Majesty George 
the Third, King of Great Britain, France and Ireland, Defender of 
the Faith, etc* In witness whereof this plate is set up, and his 
Britannic Majesty's colors left flying as a mark of 
possession.•••
10
Withdrawal
Clearly, the 1774 withdrawal from the Falklanda and the subsequent British 
absence for 59 years, when combined with the failure of the British to match 
Spanish reservations of sovereignty in its own 1771 declaration and the 
conclusion of the 1790 Nootka Sound Convention (which excluded British 
settlement in the region), greatly weaken Britain's claim to the Islands* The 
Spanish, on the other hand, maintained their colony on Fast Falkland until 1811, 
when internal political circumstances forced their withdrawal* As one expert on 
international law later noted, M(tt) Is difficult to see how an international 
court••.could have held that an inscription on a piece of lead constituted a 
better title than the open, continuous, effective and peaceful display of state 
sovereignty over the archipelago generally on the part of Spain during the 
thirty-seven years which followed the British withdrawal."^
During Spanish rule, the Islands were administered by a Spanish Governor as 
a settlement, a penal colony, and as a naval station* In 1776, the Islands were 
incorporated into the Buenos Aires viceroyalty. Ironically, when domestic 
political conditions forced a Spanish departure In 1811, the Spanish also left a 
plaque as a symbol of continued sovereignty, which said: "This island together
with Its Port3, buildings, outbuildings and everything in them belongs to 
Fernando VII, King of Spain and the Indies, Soledad de Malvinas, February 7th, 
1811, being governor Pablo Guillen.
Argentine Occupation
Following the Spanish withdrawal, the Islands were essentially unoccupied 
until, in 1820, the government of the newly created United Provinces sought to 
extend its Jurisdiction over all the territory which had been included in the 
Buenos Aires viceroyalty* In November, Colonel Daniel Jewltt formally took
11
possession of the Islands on behalf of Argentina# The failure of the British to 
protest this action was, In the eyes of some, a derogation of the British claim 
to sovereignty# Yet, one must recall that the British had not yet recognized 
Argentina offically and, thus, had no official representation in Buenos Aires to 
monitor such activities#
Argentina based her claim to the Islands on the principle of uti possidetis 
(Latin for "as you possess") wherein a colony succeeds to the same territory 
encompassed by the colonial administrators# Under this principle, since the 
Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires had lnco >rated the Falklands during Spanish rule, 
the successor state to the viceroyalty—Argentina—also should inherit the 
Falklands# The Argentines assert that they inherited this territory as of the 
Spanish wlthdrawl in 1811, although "(the) war of Independence and the problems 
derived from internal struggles prevented an effective occupation of the 
islands#. .until the end of 1820##.."^ After 1820, however, the Argentines did 
exercise administrative control over the Inlands through three military 
commanders, the allocation of exploration rights and concessions, and the 
establishment of a settlement#
A British Reassertlon of Sovereignty
Although Britain granted Argentina diplomatic recognition in 1823, she did 
not object to these activities until 1829, when the appointment of Luis Vernet 
as Governor of the Political and Military District of Malvinas finally elicited 
a protest from the Brit nresentatlve in Buenos Aires, Woodbine Parish# The
British rested their cl vereignty on discovery followed by occupation#
The British defense of <lalm in 1771 and the subsequent restoration of
their settlement by the nfsh were cited as evidence of the British title#
The 1774 departure was . he temporary and their claim to sovereignty "..a
12
dormant right of which they Intended to avail themselves whun convenient 
Thus, the British response to the Argentine claim was that
the Government of the United Provinces (Argentina) could not 
reasonably have anticipated that the British Government would 
permit any other state to exercise a right as derived from Spain 
which Great Britain had denied to Spain itself.
The already tenuous British title undeniably was further weakened by their 
absence from the Islands for over half a century. The declarations of 1771, one 
must recall, did not resolve the issue of sovereignty. Rather, the declarations 
restored the status quo ante 10 June 1770 and merely suspended resolution of the 
sovereignty dispute. Thus, the validity of the British title was still in 
question at the time the settlement waB abandoned and nothing occurred in the 
interim years to alleviate this uncertainty. Consequently, the legitimacy of 
Britain's reoccupatton of the Islands, in 1833, is suspect, especially since the 
Argentine claim is bolstered by their effective exercise of sovereignty over the 
Islands for thirteen years.
The American-Argentine Dispute
The return of the British was preceded by an Amerlcan/Argentine dispute 
over fishing rights in the Islands. In an attempt to protect the seal 
population, the Argentine Governor of the Falklands, Luis Vernet, attempted to 
terminate the sealing concession. In 1831, when his orders were ignored, the 
Governor seized three American ships (the Harriet, Superior, and Breakwater).
The Americans claimed the arrest was executed violently; Vernet denied this.
The dispute provided a convenient opportunity for Britain to reassert Its claim 
to the Islands, a desire motivated partially by a heightened strategic Interest 
in establishing a naval depot on the Falklands. For the United States,
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supporting British sovereignty claims over the Islands—and, thus, Implying the 
Illegitimacy of Argentine rule—allowed her to escape the dispute over the 
sealers' actions. Thus, the Americans initiated a dialogue with the British, 
supporting their claim for the Islands in order to diminish American 
culpability. An 1831 letter from the U.S, State Department to the American 
charge d'affaires in Buenos Aires, John Forbes, urged Forbes to advance the 
British claim to the Argentine government:
•••You should address an earnest remonstrance to that Government 
(the Argentine) against any measures that may have been adopted 
by lt«*«whlch are calculated*, to Impose any restraints whatever 
upon the enterprise of our citizens.••• The Government of Buenos 
Ayres can certainly deduce no good title to these Islands, from 
any fact connected with their history,
With respect to the Monroe Doctrine, the Falklands were considered to be a 
pre-revolutionary possession of the British, thereby making the Doctrine 
inapplicable.
The bnited States had dispatched the USS Lexington to the region in 
November as a response to the detention of the American ships. In December, the 
commander, Silas Duncan forcibly dissembled the Argentine settlement on the 
Falklands and declared the Islands to be free of government, apparently all with 
the connivance of the British.^
The Return of the British
In mld-1832, the British chose to take advantage of the dissolution of the 
Argentine settlement and reclaim the Falklands, Two Warships—HMS Clio and Tyne 
were dispatched under the command of Captain J.J, Onslow, In December, Captain 
Onslow offically took possession of the Islands and the remaining Argentines 
were expelled in January, 1833, Thus, the British reoccupied the islands and
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have administered them to the present. Although the legitimacy of the British 
claim to the Islands was questionable, in the 19th century world of po^ /er 
politics, the British hold was undeniable. As one Argentine has noted: "The
English position was very weak from a political and legal point of view but very 
strong from a military and naval stance.”* * Still, the House of Commons Foreign 
Affairs Committee has acknowledged that
the weight of the evidence argues in favour of the view that 
Argentina's title to the Falkland Islands (or at least to East 
Falkland) was, at the time of the British occupation in 1833, of 
greater substance than is or has been credited by official United 
Kingdom Government Sources. ™
Strategic Interest in the Falklands
The nineteenth century saw the apex of the Falklands' strategic 
contribution to the British empire. The Falkland Islands possessed only a 
minimal potential for economic development (beyond sheep-raising and fishing). 
Their importance was as a coaling station and naval depot along the strategic 
Cape Horn trade routes. As Medford suggests, "the Falklands were acquired at a 
time when a base near the Straits of Magellan was essential for naval control of 
the Pacific Coast of South America and the South A t l a n t i c . T h e  contribution 
which the Falklands made to British imperial defense was acknowledged in 
numerous governmental reports throughout the 1800s, including those of the 
Carnarvon Commission,^ the Select Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure, 
and an 1881 Report on Coaling Stations. Both the location of the Islands and 
their own natural formation contributed to their value as a naval depot. The 
glowing descriptions offered of the Islands were numerous, Commander George 
Grey, upon visiting the islands In 1836, commented that
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It is Impossible to imagine a finer harbour than this, land 
locked on every side, easy to approach and capable of holding the 
whole English Navy,.., Professionally considered as lying as It 
were in the highway of vessels tound round Cape Horn and in 
containing the finest harbours In the world their value is not to 
be doubted*3'
Not surprisingly, then, the Carnarvon Commission reported that the Falklands 
could e made an admirable coaling and refitting station for the royal Navy 
and mercantile Marine.
Although the Islands" primary value was military, some sort of permanent 
settlement had to be erected to ensure continued British sovereignty* Yet, the 
bleak conditions and meager economic prospects, made it an unattractive option 
for would-be settlers* The government considered both importing Chelsea 
Pensioners to develop the colony^ and establishing a penal colony (as the 
Spanish had done during their administration of the Islands)* Neither of these 
schemes enjoyed much success and the population of the Islands has remained 
consistently small*
The Falklands in World War I
The Battle of the Falkland Islands on 8 December, 1914 was, in the eyes of 
some, the decisive naval battle of World War I, for the British success secured 
shipping and communication lines in the southern hemisphere*^
(Success) in war at sea was largely determined by the security of 
communications and*..the security of communications depended upon 
the maintenance of naval bases located at useful points around 
the world* Furthermore, a battleship's radius of action depended 
upon her coal supply and this again depended upon the 
availability of fuel at set places along the communclatlon 
lines***
The Falklands represented such a center in the South Atlantic, so it was the 
logical meeting place for opposing sea forces In the South Atlantic in 1914.
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The Rattle of the Falklnnds was the British response to the l November sinking 
of two British cruisers by the German East Asiatic Squadron, under the command 
of Vice-Admiral Graf Von Spee, at the Battle of Coronel. By dispatching a large 
task force to the Falklands, the British were able to surprise the Germans and 
avenge Coronel by sinking four German ships, forcing the withdrawal of the 
German's East Asiatic Squadron for the remainder of the war* The Falkland 
Islanders contributed to this success by manning the signals station and warning 
the British force of the approaching Germans* As a result, the 8th of December 
is celebrated still in the Falkland Islands in commemoration of the great 
British victory.*3 
The Falklands In World War II
The Falkland Islands also made an Important contribution to World War II*
In December, 1939, the British were able to sink the German battleship Graf Spee 
off the Falklands* Churchill, too, recognized the Islands' Importance for 
protecting Britain's strategic position in the South Atlantic* In a telegram to 
Lord Halifax, Churchill stressed H*. the vital necessity of the (Falkland) 
Islands to us*”**
20th Century Decline In Strategic Value
Although the Falkland Islands played an Important role In both World Wars, 
their value decreased markedly In the twentieth century for a number of reasons* 
The opening of the Panama Canal reduced the importance of the trade route past 
the Falklands* The emergence of strategic air power diminished the role of the 
navy In power projection and, consequently, decreased the need for naval 
outposts like the Falkland Islands* Finally, at the end of World War II,
Britain revised her strategic outlook from an Imperial to a Eurocentric 
orientation: colonies—like the Falkland Islands—no longer received priority
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consideration In defense decision-making and resource allocation* All of these 
reflect the fact that, for Britain, the global environment at the end of the 
Second World War was vastly different from that which had existed at the opening 
of the twentieth century* Britain had fallen to the ranks of a second-rate 
power; Britain's economy had weakened—she had been surpassed Industrially; and, 
both Internationally and domestically, empire had become ideologically pasle*
Despite the Intensity and widespread nature of the post-World War II 
decolonization drive, the Falkland Islands were essentially unaffected* The 
Islands' population wished to remain tied to Britain, recognizing, perhaps, the 
lnfeaslhlllty of existing as an Independent state due to their small size and 
bleak economic p o t e n t i a l T h e  British Government, for its part, could hardly 
force 2,000 of Her Majesty's loyal subjects into an Independence they neither 
desired nor could maintain* So, while Britain shed her most valuable colonial 
possessions—India, Egypt, Aden—she retained this obscure collection of islands 
in the South Atlantic*
The Dispute in the 20th Century
Throughout the lBOOs and 1900s, the Argentinians continued to protest 
British occupation of the Falkland Islands* Formal protests were Issued in 
1833, 1834, 1841, 1842, 1829, 1884, and 1888, and at regualr intervals after 
1908*^ On a number of occasions, hostilities were threatened in the region*
For example, in February, 1952, a group of British scientists attempting to land 
on Hope Bay (a Falkland Islands Dependency) were fired upon by an Argentine 
expeditionary force* The British Government feared that these actions resulted 
from the pugnacious approach of the Argentine President Juan Peron to the 
Falkland Islands dlpute* In 1951, Peron had declared that Argentina would 
retake the islands through scientific expeditions "step by step*"^ In response
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to the Hope Bay incident, Prime Minister Churchill dispatched 30 Royal Marines 
and a Royal Navy frigate in a secret deployment. The conflict was resolved 
quietly and, by July, the crisis was over*
Tn February, 1976, a British research ship—HMS Shackleton—was accosted by 
an Argentine ship for allegedly traversing in Argentine territorial waters* 
Later, a naval aircraft fired shots over the ships bow* This led to a serious 
diplomatic dispute, with the British ambassador being withdrawn from Buenos 
Aires.48
In 1977, an illegal Argentine settlement on Southern Thule (a Falklands* 
Dependency) was discovered and hostilities were threatened again* Prime 
Minister Callaghan responded by secretly dispatching a nuclear-powered submarine 
as a precaution, in case the diplomatic situation deteriorated* Talks in July 
proved disappointing and the domestic Argentine situation suggested military 
action might by taken by the Argentines* A Foreign Office report suggested 
that:
"The Argentines are clearly pursuing their Interest at two 
levels—on the surface a dialogue and negotiation: beneath the
surface they are planning action against the Falklands*. * *
By December, the potential for conflict had disappeared*
The Progress of Negotiations Prior to 1982
The twentieth century has also witnessed numerous attempts at resolving the 
dispute through negotiations* The Argentine government first raised the issue 
at the United Nations in 1964 at a meeting of the Special Committee on the 
Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and People (a*k*a*, the Committee of 
Twenty-Four)* In 1963, the U*N* advocated a negotiated settlement to the
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dispute In accordance with Its i960 resolution on decolonization (Resolution 
1514 (XV)) and reiterated this policy In resolutions in 1966, 1969, 1971, 1973, 
and 1976.*^ Anglo-Argentine talks also took place between 1964 and 19R2 but 
enjoyed little success.*1 The only substantive agreement was the 1971 
Communications Agreement, the negotiations for which specifically excluded the 
central issue of sovereignty. The Communications Agreement was to promote 
closer ties between Argentina and the Falkland Islanders and, towards this end, 
it was agreed that the Argentines would construct a landing strip on the 
Falkland Islands to facilitate transport; the Argentine Navy would provide 
shipping service to the islands; an Argentine/Falkland Islands student exchange 
would commence; and tourism would be promoted.** Beyond this, though, 
negotiations had markedly little success. While Argentines sought quickly 
discernible results and Immediate discussion of the sovereignty Issue, the 
British recognized that a surrender of sovereignty over the Islands, In the 
short-term, was—at the very least--politleally infeasible. The Falkland 
Islanders garnered a great deal of support from the British populate. Thus, for 
the British, any solution would have to extend over the long-term. The 
resolution of sn exceedingly complicated dispute was Turther hampered fey the 
different negotiating approaches of the two parties. For nearly a century and a 
half, the Argentines had been frustrated by the apparent intransigence of the 
British concerning the Falkland Islands dispute and, in April, 1982, that 
frustration was transformed into an active militancy.
CHAPTER TWO:
THE CONFLICT
Prelude to Invasion
The mid-March arrival of 41 Argentine scrapworkers on South Georgia Island 
Initiated a diplomatic dispute between the United Kingdom and Argentina, prior 
to the actual outbreak of hostilities on 2 April* While the expedition had been 
cleared with the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, the workers' failure to 
register at Grytviken upon arrival at South Georgia and their hoisting of the 
Argentine flag caused the British to order the workers' evacuation. The British 
government dispatched HHS Endurance (the Antarctic supply ship) to Grytviken to 
ensure Argentine compliance. As a response, the Argentines directed the supply 
ship Bahia Paralso to protect the Argentine citlaens on South Georgia. As 
regional tension^ exacerbated, the British deployed a destroyer (Exeter) and a 
nuclear-powered submarine (Su jJO. The Argentines subsequently answered with 
the dispatch of two frigates (the Drummond and Granville)* By 2 April, however, 
the dlpute had become just one aspect of the larger conflict which involved both 
the Falkland Islands and her Dependencies.
The Beginning of Conflict
By 9:13 in the morning of 2 April—within three hourB of landing on the 
Islands—the Argentines had forced the surrender of the British forces on the 
Falkland Islands and the Governor, Sir Rex Hunt. The following day, at a 
special session of Parliament, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher informed
20
21
the House of Commons both of the Invasion and of her decision to dispatch a task 
force to the region* Because It would take the task force from two to three 
weeks to reach the Falklands, there was leeway for a negotiated settlement to 
the conflict and, indeed, neither the British nor the Argentine government 
believed that actual armed conflict would ensue* In an address to the House of 
Commons, Prime Minister Thatcher commented: "I stress that I cannot fortell
what orders the task force will receive as it proceeds. That will depend on the 
situation at the time."!
Attempts at Peaceful Resolution
Attempts at a peaceful resolution began with the passage of the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution #502, which called for an Immediate 
cessation of hostilities, an Argentine withdrawal, and a peaceful solution to 
the dispute* The passage of the resolution represented a significant moral 
victory for the British because It labeled Argentina the aggressor and 
legitimised Britain's military response*
Following the passage of Resolution #502, the American Secretary of State, 
Alexander Haig, commenced a shuttle diplomacy between Buenos Aires and London* 
Unfortunately, Haig's attempts at negotiation soon foundered; he was unable to 
find a middle ground between the demands of the '.wo sides* Argentina would not 
budge without concrete British concessions on the issue of sovereignty.
Britain, on the other Viand, would never defer to negotiating demands which were 
based on the coercive f . ce of military aggression and forceful occupation* The 
peace proposals forward? y President Belaunde of Peru and by the United
Nations Secretary Grporai Sonor Perez de Cuellar, faced a similar fate* While
neither government < ir-d military confrontation, it Is not surprising that 
diplomatic efforts Britain and Argentina had quarreled over sovereignty
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for almost a century and a half; to expect major concessions from either side 
when each was negotiating under duress and in the spotlight of world opinion was 
somewhat unrealistic.
M11 i tary Conf l ict^  Commences
Britain's military response began with the establishment of a maritime 
exclusion zone on 12 April. This was upgraded to a total exclusion zone on 30 
April. On 25 April, British troops landed on South Georgia and reclaimed it 
without loss of life on either side. This military success was followed by a 
political success for Britain. On 30 April, the United States' government 
abandoned its neutral stance and officially announced its support for Britain. 
British satisfaction at this move was matched only by the feelings of disgust 
and betrayal held in Buenos Aires. The Argentine leader, General heopoldo 
Gal tier!, stated: ”1 feel much bitterness towards Reagan, who I thought was my
f riend•^
The campaign on the Falkland Islands began on 1 May with a British 
bombardment of the Port Stanley airfield. With this attack, the British clearly 
manifested their resolve to retake the Islands. In the eyes of some analysts, 
this act terminated the prospects for a negotiated settlement
The 2 May sinking of the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano, Is more 
widely associated with ending hopes for a negotiated resolution. The sinking 
marked a clear escalation of the conflict: 368 crewmen were killed while the
ship was both outside the exclusion zone and steaming away from the Falklands 
and the British task force. As a containment tactic, the sinking was a success; 
the Argentine fleet remained in coastal waters for the duration of the conflict 
and the British gained control of the sea before their forces attempted to land 
on the Islands. Yet, the political costs of the attack were high. Previously,
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Britain had garnered a great deal of support by portraying Itself as the victim 
of Argentine aggression. By Inflicting the first major loss of life in the 
conflict and by doing so outside its own prescribed exclusion zone and beyond 
Its original rules of engagement, Britain's image of innocence quickly 
dissipated and the blame for the failure of negotiations is laid at her feet. 
The political cost of this military action has continued to mount as 
investigators of the General Belgrano sinking have uncovered inaccuracies and 
inconsistencies in the government's statements on the sinking.^ From a 
strategic viewpoint, the Belgrano sinking was a success; from a political 
perspective, it was, at best, a Pyrrhic victory. In any conflict, balancing 
political dictates and military exigencies is difficult. This problem 
exacerbates, especially for open societies, when the campaign is waged within 
the arena of world opinion. Lawrence Freedman acknowledged this difficulty 
when, In reference to the Belgrano sinking, he commented that "Any military 
action which is not self-evidently for defensive purposes, even If it is 
pre-emptive, becomes an outrage."*1
The Argentines quickly responded, in kind, to the sinking of the General 
Ifajlflranp» On 4 May, a missile attack destroyed by fire HMS Sheffield. On 21 
May, the Campaign's focus switched from that of a naval conflict to that of a 
land-based campaign when the British established a beachhead at San Carlos.^ 
This stage of the conflict saw the Royal Navy involved in its biggest battle
Q
since World War II. The ensuing Argentine air attacks saw one British Type-21 
frigate (HMS Ardent) sunk and four more damaged. The airborne assualt on the 
Royal Navy continued vintil 23 May, while, onshore, a logistic hulld-up was 
underway.
Finally, on 2A May, the reoccupatlon battle commenced as the British moved
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against Gooso Green and narwin* At thi , point in the campaign, the British 
forces found themselves battling more than just the Argentines* Military 
commanders also were fighting deteriorating weather, logistical difficulties, 
and intense political pressure for a rapid end to the campaign* One commander 
even noted that "There was a real fear that we might he gazing at each other for 
months around Port Stanley."^ The battle for Pert Stanley—the last major 
Argentine atronghoid—began on 11 June. On 14 June, the Argentine General Mario 
Menendez surrendered to the British at Port Stanley. On 20 June, the British 
removed from the dependency of Southern Thule, an Argentine research station 
which had been operating without authorization since 1976.
The Aftermath of the Conflict
The campaign cost Britain 255 dead and 777 wounded. The operation coat 700 
million pounds plus 900 million pounds in lost ships and planes. The Argentines 
claimed 652 dead or missing.^ The surrender left Britain in charge of over 
11,000 Argentine prisoners-of-war* The British returned all but 600 of them 
Immediately* The remainder Britain retained in custody until Argentlnaa 
declared a ceasation of hostilities* The Argentine response was that:
The total cessation of hostilities will he achieved only when the 
United Kingdom agrees to lift the naval and air blockade and the 
economic sanctions*..and when it withdraws the military forces 
occupying the Islands.
However, the Argentines said they would observe a de facto cessation of 
hostilities and this was accepted by Britain as a sufficient guarantee for the 
return of the remaining prisoners. Thus, the military—but clearly not the 
political—campaign for the Falkland Islands had ended. The British had sent 
the Argentines a clear message, the essence of which was reflected in a statment
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by a Falkland Inlander to a young Argentine soldier: "Don't you come planting
your little flag here again! Jorge."^
CHAPTER THREE;
The Failure of Deterrence
Introduction
For 149 yearn prior to the 19R2 campaign, the British and ArgentInea had 
prevented the escalation of their dispute Into active hostilities. What minor 
skirmishes had occurred were brief, of low Intensity, and never officially 
sanctioned. Rut, due to mismanagement, misjudgment, and mlaintrepretatton on 
both sides, crisis prevention faltered and, consequently, military conflict 
ensued. Although the fighting has stopped now, the underlying generative 
dispute remains unresolved. Until negotiations can produce a substantive 
solution to the problem, conflict management represents the sole means of 
averting further bloodshed. An awareness of the mistakes—both British and 
Argentine—which led to the outbreak of hostilities In April, 1982, Is 
essential, If repltltlon of past errors Is to be avoided*
"The Falklands war will be presented by history as a classic example of a 
war that need not have happened,"* The miscalculations and misjudgments which 
led to this conflict are numerous, but, essentially, they center on the failure 
of both Britain and Argentina to assess correctly the motivations of the other 
regarding the Falklands, Until the British task force engaged the Argentines In 
the South Atlantic, neither Argentina nor Britain actually expected to be 
involved In a full-scale military campaign. Indeed, as Philip Windsor notes, 
the Falklands campaign was
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...one of the very fen wars in history In which one nation had no 
real intention of invading, and the other fought for territory 
which it had spent twenty years saying it did not really want.2
The British, for their part, erred both In the signals they sent Buenos 
Aires and in interpreting the signals coming from Argentina. A number of 
British actions contributed to the Argentine perception that the British were 
not wholly committed to the Islands' protection. Failing to consider how their 
Falklands policies were perceived in Argentina was the fatal British flaw, for 
this assumption of declining British Interest in the Islands underlay all 
Argentine diplomatic and military calculations in early 1982.
The Significance of the Islends for Britain
For some time, Britain's negotiating stance had reflected a growing desire 
(at least in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to reach an accommodation with 
Argentina in the dispute. The end of World War II saw Britain's withdrawal from 
an Imperial role and the development of a Eurocentric strategic outlook.^ Yet, 
much to the frustration of the Argentine's, Britain's retrenchment did not 
Include the Falkland Islands. A number of factors help explain why, when 
Britain had surrendered the heart of her empire—India, Aden, and the remainder 
East of Sues—she retained the relatively insignificant Falkland Islands.
Because the Islands population is almost wholly of British ancestry and desires 
to maintain ties with the United Kingdom, neither Indigenous nor significant 
International pressure for decolonisation developed. The desires of the 
Islanders have occasioned the curious marriage of imperialism and 
self-determination. On 20 May 1968, the Falkland Islands Legislative Council 
affirmed
•••the desire of the Falkland Islanders to remain British, under
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Che British crown and ever closely linked to the homeland of the 
United Kingdom.^
Until the 1980s—when a fall In wool prices hurt the Islands' economy—the 
Falklands were self-supporting, debt free, and contributing to the British 
balance of payments.^ Finally, the Islands themselves possess an Inherent 
value. In the event of a crisis which closed the Panama Canal, the Falklands 
would represent an important strategic outpost along the South Atlantic 
transport route. The Islands already possess some strategic Importance, 
standing, as they do, at the doorway to the Antarctic. Rumors of potential 
mineral discoveries have further enhanced the Islands' perceived value. To the 
Argentines, the territorial value of the Falklands Is considered substantial*
As one Argentine diplomat noted, ’There Is not the least doubt that the 
territory of the Falkland Islands la much more Important than the population."^ 
Yet, the geographic significance of the Falklands has been greatly exaggerated 
by some Argentines who believe Britain's sole interest In the Islands la as a 
regional military base. While the Islands do possess some Innate physical 
Importance, considering Britain's Eurocentric strategy and the immense cost of 
garrisoning the Islands, the Falklands represent a liability* The tie that 
binds the Falklands to Britain is a human one: "(no) British political party
(Is) willing to assume responsibility for turning British citisens out of their 
homes to appease a foreign power 
Britain's Negotiating Stance
While Britain asserts continually her claim to the Islands, government 
officlals—especially In the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—have become 
Increasingly aware of the need to reach an accommodation with Argentina. This 
belief was reinforced In 1976 by the Shackleton Report, which stated that a
29
o
resolution of the dispute was essential for the Islands' economic development. 
Thus, through negotiations, the British have sought a solution which would 
gradually assimilate the Island residents into the Argentine population* Only 
in this manner could Britain resolve its dispute with Argentina without 
seemingly sacrificing the Islanders* The 1971 Communications Agreement, then, 
was a means of Increasing the ties between the Islands and Argentina* The 
British hoped that this increased contact would decrease the antlpatny which 
Falklanders held for Argentina* More than diminish local aversion for 
Argentina, however, the Agreement Increased Islander fears of a Foreign Office 
sell-out* The Falkland Islanders have a very strong lobby group in Parliament 
which is able to play both sides of the political spectrum by appealing both to 
the Imperial nostalgia of Conservatives and to Labour's abhorrence of military 
dictatorship* This lobby ensures that the Islanders' views are considered in 
Falklands policy formulation*
By 1979, when Margaret Thatcher assumed power, leaseback appeared to be the 
only possible solution to which both Buenos Aires and the Falkland Islanders 
might agree* The remaining options—either discontinuing negotiations and 
garrisoning the Islands (a.k.a.i Fortress Falklands) or preserving the status 
quo under a facade of negotiation—were untenable and .carried a serious 
threat of invasion*"^ Islander reaction to the 1easeback idea was cool* While 
many seemed unsure about the idea, a large and vocal group virulently opposed 
the proposition. The 1981 elections to the Falkland Islands Legislative Council 
reflected a growing opposition to negotiating sovereignty with Argentina* By 
the time negotiations commenced in 1981, those Involved in the Falklands' 
government supported freeslng the dispute and were decidedly opposed to 
leaseback* The Falkland Islands Joint Councils expressed this view in no
uncertain terms:
While this House *Ws nqt like any nf the Ideas put f of W/ttd, . . for 
a possible settlement of the sovereignty dl' pute wlfli Afjffntina, 
I t  agrees that Her Majesty's Ooverumen* should hold further talks 
with the Argentines at wbi<h.*,the Br i t i sh delegation should seek 
an agreement to *eze the * *>pu?e over sr»vt*re 1 gtity fof d 
spec i f ied  period t ime.1'
Britain Unaware of Argentine Impatience^
While Britain's flexibility for negotiating a settlement decreased, 
pressures for substantial progress in the negotiations increased In Argentina, 
Eventually, the imperative of progress would compel an Argent 1 tie resort fn  Iot re 
In the hope that military action would serve as a catalyst tor sovereignty 
negotiations* The British, however, failed to appreciate the changed Argentine 
mood, despite the numerous Indications of its nature, r.eneral Hal tier!--then 
Army Commander-ln-Chlef—vocalized this mood in May, 1981, when he commented: 
"Nobody can or will be able to say that we have not been extremely calm and 
patient... However, after a century and a half they (negotiation delays) are 
becoming more and more unbearable,"^ Almost Immediately upon his assumption of 
power In December 1981, (altieri resurrected an old blueprint for a military 
Invasion of the Falklands.
After nearly 149 years of seeking a peaceful resolution to the dispute, the 
resort to force was motivated by more than mere impatience* Still, Irritation 
arid frustration with the lack of progress did serve as an Impetus to action*
The 150th anniversary (1983) of the British occupation of the Islands loomed 
ahead of the Argentine rulers as a deadline^ for the restoration of Argentine 
sovereignty* Because Argentine political culture emphasizes the almost sacred 
character of national territory, the anniversary of the loss of the Islands
Mwould onl y  under score n sons** of nation, ! ml 1 tat Ion and frustration over the
1 KStlf1 •
h< -xploalvi* p;lf al I: the 'ipproaching annlversay was not ecogni zed by 
la* British do« 1 n ' >mprehension of this aspect of the Argentine political 
har,,< f * B public and political opinion has persistently underrated
the stre,  nth of feeling in Argentina about the Fa Ik lands." n  While, in 
,tgl<»~Sax(.n political culture, territorial sovereignty is viewed in the context
of promoting the welfare and security of the individual, Argentines consider 
territorial sovereignty an end in itself.** This tradition is reflected in the 
attitude of the citizenry regarding the Islands. Beginning in their childhood, 
Argentines are Inculcated with the theme: "has Malvinas son nosotros”-The
Malvinas (Falkland.) are ours. In Britain, prior to the conflict, few people 
were even aware of the Islands' existence, let alone their location. According 
to one opinion poll, the majority of Britons thought the Falkland Islands lay 
somewhere off the Scottish coast!* *
Britain: Sending the Wrong Political Signals
The military leaders of Argentina were well aware of the British public's
disinterest in the FaIk lands and undoubtedly this knowledge reinforced the 
perception that Britain would not respond militarily to an Argentine occupation 
of the Islands. To the Argentines, an air of official unconcern complemented 
the apathy of the British public. Throughout the years, preceding the crisis, a 
number of significant Falkland Islands' policy changes were made in Britain that 
suggested to the Argentines that the Falklands were of minor import to Britain. 
Whether or not Britain Intended to convey this attitude is irrelevant; how 
British actions were perceived In Buenos Aires is what provided a major impetus 
for the Argentine invasion. Had the Argentine leaders not been convinced of a
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muted British response, the invasion would not have occured, One Argentine 
officer commented ’The truth is that the Junta never believed that the British
would really fight
One of the most consistent signals of Britain's disinterest was their 
negotiating position. Thr ugh the years, the stance changed gradually from one 
of an adamant refusal to discusH sovereignty, to a declared willingness, in 
1976, to cede sovereignty in accordance with the Islanders' wishes, and, 
finally, to attempting to persuade the Islanders to accept a plan which entailed 
the transfer of sovereignty to Argentina (leaseback). In the course of 
negotiations, Argentina was allowed to vastly increase contact with the Islands 
through th< provision of essential services. Argentina provided the Islanders 
with air and sea transportatioi; postal, telegraphic, and telephone services; 
education In Argentine schools; commercial services; and documentation for free 
Islander travel within Argentina. In Buenos Aires, Britain's willingness both 
to discuss sovereignty and to increase Argentine relations with the Islands was 
Interpreted as declining concern for the Islands' future. The treasury 
demonstrated little Interest In the Falklands' development and, consequently, 
none of the Shackleton report's suggestions for expanding the economy were 
implemented. An Argentine intelligence report concluded that "Great Britain is 
in a desperate economic situation and would like to be able to cut off the 
Malvinas."^ The failure of the 1981 British Nationality Bill to grant the 
Islanders British citizenship represented a further lack of British commitment 
to the Falklands and the effect, which did not go unnoticed in Buenos Aires, was 
to make the Islanders virtual "Argentine passport holders."^
Under the Thatcher government, the negotiating process stagnated as the 
Islanders became more obstinate in their opposition to sovereignty talks. Had
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the Thatcher governemnt openly supported leaseback, the pressure to adopt a more 
flexible position might have persuaded the Islanders to support leaseback, or at 
least have made them more amenable to compromise* Initially, an estimated 
one-third to one-half of the Falklands' population was not opposed to the 
leaseback proposition and British pressure might have converted more In favor of 
the idea* Instead, the British government refused to pressure the Islanders, 
thereby, precluding a negotiated settlement to the dispute, at least In the 
short term*
Britain: Sending the Wrong Military Signals
In addition to political Indications of declining official Interest In the 
Falklands, the British government's military policies signalled a decrease in 
both Its desire and ability to assert sovereignty over the Falklands* As British 
defense policy contracted to the European theatre, deployments and activities 
beyond the NATO area decreased markedly, and the Falkland Islands were no 
exception. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as Argentina's military capabilities 
increased—in part, due to British arms sales and the provision of training 
facilities In the United Kingdom—the British presence in the South Atlantic 
dwindled* In ; the Commander-In-Chief, South Atlantic was withdrawn, along
with the Royal Navy's frigate deployed in the region* In 1974, the termination 
of the Simonstown agreements removed the closest British base (which was already 
one week's sailing time away) to the Falkland Islands* Cuts in financing for 
the British Antarctic Survey and the threatened closure of its base at 
Grytviken, South Ceorgla further suggested an intention to abandon the South 
Atlantic* With only one detachment of Royal Marines and an ice patrol ship left 
to defend the Islands, the Argentines could not help but infer that the 
Falklands were of little value to Britain* The needs of the Falklanders seemed
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as far from the minds of ministers as the Islands physically were from 
Whitehall•
The 1981 Defence White Paper announced the sale of the carrier HMS 
Invincible to Australia, an act with serious implications for Britain's ability 
to independently conduct an amphibious assault outside the NATO area. An 
earlier decision to scrap the amphibious assault ships, HMS Fearless and 
Intrepid, had drawn such intense criticisms from Parliament and the defense 
community as to reverse the policy. Since an invasion of the Falkland Islands 
could be countered only with an amphibious campaign, the significance of 
Thatcher's reduction of the surface fleet was appreciated in Argentina.
The 1981 Defence Review also called for the withdrawal of HMS Endurance, 
the Antarctic ice patrol ship. While the ship contributed only marginally to 
regional defense, HMS Endurance had a symbolic value wholly disproportionate to 
its military capacity. The ship represented a continued British interest in the 
South Atlantic and, relatedly, in the Falkland Islands. In essence, HMS 
Endurance performed the age-old function of "showing the flag"; and its planned 
withdrawal was widely interpreted in Argentina as yet another indication of 
Britain's d s i r e  to shed the Falklands' burden. One Argentine ’ plomat noted 
that the decision was read in Buenos Aires as a
•..deliberate political gesture; they did not see it as an 
inevitable economy in Britain's defence budget since the 
implications for the Islands and for Britain's position in the 
South Atlantic were fundamental.
Fears that such a conclusion would be drawn in Buenos Aires prompted heated 
debate of the policy in London. Prime Minister Thatcher insisted that the Royal 
Marine garrison on the Falklands and occasional ship visits would reflect
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British interest in the region and that budgetary constraints had forced this 
re-evaluation of priorities. However, opponents of the policy considered more 
than mere economics to be at issue. As Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Hlll-Norton 
argued:
The consequence of (the withdrawal) will almost certainly be 
disastrous In the political, military, and economic fields alike, 
and equally probably it will be irreversible...(It) is my view 
that to withdraw the Endurance would be the clearest signal 
imaginable of our lack, or loss, of interest, not only in the 
Falklands but in the whole area, that signal will at once be 
read with anguish b)( our friends and with delight...by any 
potential opponent.**^
Even the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, called three times for a 
reconsideration of the policy, but to no avail. His opposition to the policy 
continued, even until his resignation at the beginning of the conflict. The 
Falkland Islanders, too, expressed opposition to the policy. One Islander, B.G. 
Frow from the Falkland Islands Office, wrote to John Nott, the Defense 
Secretary, Imploring him to reconsider. "We would most earnestly request that 
you review the decision to withdraw HMS Endurance, which has further damaged the 
morale of the Islanders and confirmed their fears that the British Government is 
deserting them.”^  The protests went unheeded; however, Endurance was given a 
reprieve following the Campaign.
The British reaction to the Argentine occupation of Southern Thule in 1976 
and 1978 and of South Georgia in March 1982 was mild. In fact, the muted nature 
of the British response in both cases seemed to confirm the Argentine belief 
that the British reaction to an invasion of the Falkland Islands would be 
equally impotent. General Galtleri even described the likelihood of a 
substantive British response as "scarcely possible and totally Improbable
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The Thatcher government failed to respond decisively to the South Georgia 
Incident out of fears that Military action on their part would precipitate an 
attack on the Falkland Islands* In actuality, this lack of response helped 
motivate the invasion by convincing leaders that no firm British response would 
be forthcoming* Members of the opposition suggested that Thatcher should have 
resurrected the 1977 policy of dispatching a covert submarine to the area. Yet, 
the only type of response which might have been effective was an overt display 
of commitment to the Islands and to preserving British sovereignty*
Through its political, economic, and military policies in the Falklands, 
the British government had convinced Argentine leaders that Britain's interest 
In the Islands was on the wane* "If ever a nation was tired of colonial 
responsibility, this was it."^ Much of the British public was lgiorant even of 
the Islands' existence and, until the Invasion sparked an atavistic jingoism, 
they were apathetic about their fate* Through negotiations, the British 
government had ceded responsibility for much of the Islands' provision to 
Argentina and had Indicated a willingness to transfer sovereignty if the 
Islanders concurred* The Falklands population was the sole remaining obstacle 
to Argentine sovereignty* Beyond suggesting an official disinterest In 
asserting sovereignty rights, Britain's policies reflected An unwillingness both 
to guarantee the Islanders' well-being and to uphold their ties with Britain*
The Islanders were denied British citizenship, funds for economic development 
were scarce, and the British military presence had dwindled to trivial levels* 
Britain's post-World War II retrenchment had left the Falklands "*•.increasingly 
exposed, dependent not on real military power but on the memory of It* They 
were protected by a form of historic b l u f f * T h e s e  measures were read in 
Argentina as a virtual guarantee that Argentine action against the Islands would
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be opposed only by futile protests and feeble indignation* While the British 
may not have intended to portray this image, their fault lies in falling to 
consider how their actions would be Interpreted in Buenos Aires*
Brlta n Misreads Argentina
Along with Britain's failure to represent clearly to Argentina its 
intentions regarding the Falkland Islands, the British government committed a 
second fatal error* Because Britain failed to appreciate the qualitative 
changes which had occurred in Argentina's approach to the Falkland Islands 
dispute, the governement did not effect the modifications In its own policy 
necessary to deter a conflict* As the 1980s opened, the Argentine government 
desperately needed an issue which would divert public attention from the 
domestic woes which challenged the government's stability* As noted earlier, 
territorial disputes—su^h as the Falkland Islands and the Beagle Channel 
dispute with Chile—possessed an immense capacity to arouse the passion of 
Argentine citizens* As the military regime became more desperate and when the 
International Court of Justice found in favor of Chile in its adjudication of 
the Beagle Channel dispute (a decision Argentina renounced), a positive 
development in the Falkland Islands dispute was Increasingly viewed as a means 
of restoring the government's credibility* While substantial British 
concessions at the negotiating table would have sufficed, the Inflexible 
position of the Islanders left Britain with little maneuverability* In response 
to Argentine calls for concrete developments, Britain offered only a freeze on 
the status quo* Had Britain correctly Interpreted the changed mood in Buenos 
Aires, the government might have been more willing to pressure the Islanders and 
to make firm commitments at the negotiations* Instead, the Thatcncr government 
remained convinced that Argentine bellicosity was mere bluff and felt lltle
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pressure to make immediate concessions.
Argentine Motivations
The main cause of Argentina's changed attitude was the emergence among the 
military leaders of a "Nuremberg mentality."^5 Since assuming power in 1976, 
the junta had compiled an appallllng governmental record. Their human rights 
record was atrocious, around 15,000 persons were arrested and then simply 
disappeared (the desaparecldos). In addition, the economy was in a state of 
collapse and even crashed in April 1980. The foreign debt quadrupled to an 
estimated $40 billion while interest rates skyrocketed (current estimates place 
Inflation at arour.j 900%). After the wa-, the popular sentiment was that the 
Economics Minister, Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, should he arrested for "crimes 
against the c o u n t r y . T h e  junta greatly feared the public fury 
democratization or a human rights Investigation might unleash. The junta hoped 
that a negotiated settlement or, when that proved untenable, a military success 
in the Falklands would appease the public's desire for retribution. Since the 
150th anniversary of British occupation was approaching, an Argentine 
reclamation would have a special appeal. The Argentine newspaper, La Prensa, in 
February 1982, even stated that "The only thing which can save this government 
Is a war."^
In addition to the belief that Britain would not respond militarily to an 
invasion, Btitlsh Intransigence at the negotiating table Influenced the final 
decision to invade. Indeed, the Intent of the military action was not so much 
to wrest the Islands from Britain as it was to force serious progress In 
negotiations. "It (the invasion) was based on the assumption that the British 
would come to the negotiating table rather than accept the high costs and
oo
casualties of a war." When the February 1982 talks in New York ended without
39
appreciable progress, the junta became convinced that only military action could 
accelerate negotiations. At the New York meeting, the Argentines had presented 
a plan for monthly talks on a regular basis and a firm timetable for the 
establishment of Argentine sovereignty* In January 1982, a La Prensa article 
warned that If these requests were not met, "Buenos Aires will take over the 
islands by force this year*"^ On 1 March, the Argentine Foreign Affairs 
Ministry Issued a unilateral communique, coinciding with the Issue of the Joint 
communique on the New York talks, which asserted that, if the Argentine 
negotiating suggestions were Ignored, "Argentina retains the right to terminate 
the function of such a negotiating mechanism and to resort to whatever procedure 
Is commensurable with the interests of Argentina*"^ Numerous other newspapers 
and journals in Argentina echoed these same sentiments*
Argentina Not "Crying Wolf"
The British government justified it3 failure to respond to these threats on 
the numerous previous Instances where the Argentines had feigned militancy on 
the Issue* As the Foreign Minister, Lord Carrington, commented, "Had this been 
the first time over the past 20 years that some allusion to the use of force had 
been made from the Argentine side It might have struck Britain as more 
significant than It did."*** What the British failed to appreciate, however, was 
the qualitative change that had occurred In Argentine pronouncements and In 
Argentina's domestic situation* While hints of force and unofficial harassment 
had occurrred In the past, no previous Argentine rulers had coupled a 
government's contemplation of the use of force with a concurrent denunciation of 
the negotiating process* That the government Issuing these signals was In a 
desperate struggle for domestic survival only added to the signals' portentous 
nature* Whereas previous governments were satisfied that time would vindicate
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their claim an! maintained that negotiations were the proper mechanism for 
resolving the dipute, the Galtierie regime both needed Immediate success in the 
dispute and disparaged the role of negotiations in procuring a solution*
In January 1982, the Islas Malvinas Institute first signalled a semi-official 
denunciation of negotiations when its chairman, Rear Admiral Jorge Fraga, Issued 
a call that the "...endless rounds of negotiations be e n d e d . A s  noted 
previously, large numbers of newspapers and Journals began to report that the 
government might resort to military action if talks with Britain were not 
successful* That the British failed to note the substantive change that had 
occurred in Argentine rhetoric was a tragic miscalculation* An Argentine 
government's approach to negotiations—whether they support or disavow them—can 
serve as a litmus test-*-* to determine the amenability of that government to a 
peaceful resolution of the Falklands dispute. Yet, the Thatcher government 
Ignored the results of this test in 1982. The consequence was an inability to 
adequately assess the military threat to the Islands*
Aigentlne Signals
Not only did the British government underestimate the likelihood of an 
Argentine attack on the Falklands, but also the government's erroneous 
preconceptions about the events precipitating such a crisis blinded ministers to 
the military signals emanating from within Argentina* British intelligence 
reports all had predicted that any military action would be proceded by a long, 
gradual build-up of tensions which would Include the suspension of Argentine 
services to the Islands. Throughout early 1982, a possible suspension of 
services was the only immediate potential threat to the Islands in Britain's 
opinion.
The Build-up to Invasion
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Argentina's gradual Increase of pressure consisted of three stages, as did 
Britain's predicted scenario* But the only common factor between the two was 
that the final stage of both envisioned a military attack on the Islands* 
Argentina's campaign began in January 1982 with the first press statements 
renouncing negotiations and hinting of possible military action. Britain 
expected the first stage to consist insted of Increased diplomatic agitation in 
the international arena and, especially, in the United Nations* The second 
stage occurred when the Argentine government offered its support to the landing 
party on South Georgia and even dispatched three warships to prevent HMS 
Endurance's evacuation of the workers. Britain's second stage of the scenario 
predicted the suspension of Argentine services to the Islands, which never 
occurred in the pre-invasion period. When the third stage—invasion— was 
actuated, Britain was caught "sleeping in her hammock."^ British intelligence
reports In early 1982 had suggested no military action would occur for months,
and potentially not for a year. In March, Thatcher had written on a telegram 
from the Ambassador in Buenos Aires, that "We must make contingency plans."
Since no immediate action was taken, however, the statement probably referred 
either to the plans for supplying the Islands in the event of an Argentine 
withdrawal of services or to preparations for a future crisis, which was still 
considered to be months away.
Because the numerous other Indications of an impending Argentine invasion 
did not conform to Britain's expected scenario, subsequent intelligence 
assessments undervalued the significance of the signals* The problem lay not in 
a lack of indicators, but in a failure to correctly interpret the intelligence*
As Ted Rowlands disclosed in a 3 April 1982 House of Commons debate: "As well
as trying to read the mind of the enemy, we have been reading its telegrams for
42
many years."** Those who attempted to alert the British as to Argentine 
intentions found their warnings unheeded or discounted; they were modern-day 
Cassandras. The commander of HHS Endurancet Captain Barker, sent a number of 
warnings to London about the increasingly bellicose stance of Argentine rulers, 
but his messages were interpreted merely as an attempt to save his ship from 
withdrawal. The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires had sent a number c? letters 
urging that substantive progress in negotiations be made, lest the Argentines 
become restless. "Talks for the sake of talking," noted the Ambassador, were a 
privilege Argentina granted Britain and not vice versa.*®
Subtle Indicators of Invasion
Other incidents occurred which appear more ominous with hindsight, but 
nevertheless, when considered in conjunction with the copious stream of hostile 
signals emanting from Buenos Aires, these incidents were significant. On 11 
March 1983, an Argentine transport aircraft landed at Port Stanley claiming 
technical difficulties. While the Franks report (report of a committee of Privy 
Councillors on events leading up to the crisis) consider'd this an insignificant 
incident, rum s persist that some members of the Argentine Chiefs of Staff 
were on board at the time. The Franks report also denies an Argentine bulk 
purchase of maps of the Islands in Britain prior to the invasion.*® Yet, 300 
coplec of a Public Record office produced map of the Falkland 
Islands—presumably purchased by the Argentine Air Attache in London—were found 
on the Islands by British soldiers after the Argentine surrender.
British Intelligence Failure
The Franks report euphemistically charged British intelligence machinery*9 
in the pre-invasion period with being "too passive in operation."*0 More 
specifically, the failure of British intelligence involved both neglecting to
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consider how British Islands' policy was being Interpreted In Buenos Aires and 
wholly misinterpreting the signals coming from Buenos Aires* Falkland's policy 
formulation gave little consideration to how actions would be read in Argentina* 
The decision to withdraw HMS Endurance, for example, was made solely on an 
economic basis, despite innumerable indications of the dangerous manner in which 
the policy would be Interpreted in Argentina* As noted previously, British 
actions had been indicating, at best, an irresolute approach to the Islands and 
their defense for many years* Yet, when calculating the likelihood of an 
Argentine Invasion of the Falklands, Argentine perceptions of Britain's 
commitment to the Islands were not accorded serious consideration* The Franks 
report underscored this error when it expressed doubt as to .whether the 
Joint Intelligence Org<> >n attached sufficient weight to the possible
effects on Argentine thinking of the various actions of the British 
Government.”** The serious nature of this oversight cannot be exaggerated, 
since the belief in Buenos Aires that Britain would not respond militarily to an 
invasion was a constant theme of Argentine military planners and was perhaps the 
most significant factor in motivating the invasion* In the words of some 
Argentines, ’Britain had given the junta nothing but 'come-on' signs...* There 
was no Indication whatsoever that It (an Invasion) would be met with massive 
retaliation."*^
Britain seriously miscalculated Argentina's Intent to invade the Falklands* 
While British intelligence could not have been expected to predict the exact 
date of the Invasion, neither did it foresee the Imminence of Argentine military 
action when negotiations stagnated* Evidence—both British and 
Argentine—suggests that the date of the invasion was not determined until 
shortly before it occurred (around the 26th of March). The decision was
motivated by two factors: increased domestic turmoil, in the form of strikes
and protests, coincided with increased tensions on South Georgia. With the 
arrival of HMS Endurance at South Georgia, Argentina was forced to choose 
between an escalation of tensions or an ignominious retreat. The domestic 
situation meant backing down would he political suicide; the invasion option was 
more appealing since it would make the South Georgia position tenable and only a 
mild British reaction was expected anyhow. Thus, the late determination of the 
invasion time made the prediction of the exact date virtually impossible. 
However, British Intelligence failed to even adequately assess the high 
probability of Argentine military action. A major cause of the failure was the 
Joint Intelligence Committee's (JTC) fear of repeating the 1977 error, when an 
Argentine invasion was predicted, but never materialized. The fear of again 
mislabeling Argentine intentions blinded the JIG to the innumerable 
Indications—even more than in 1977—of an impending Invasion.
11 Assessments...were based on a crucial input: the intelligence community's fear
of crying wolf."^ Indeed, the reports, that the JIG submitted to the Cabinet 
were distinctly less alarmist than the raw intelligence material on which they 
were based.Accurate intelligence gathering and interpretation is an essential 
component of crisis deterrence. The Falklands conflict reflects the dangerous 
effects myopic intelligence gathering and, especially, analysis can have on 
crisis deterrence.
Argentine Miscalculations
The Argentine government, too, committed some serious miscalculations which 
involved it In a campaign Argentina was not prepared to fight. Much of the 
blame can he attributed to the desperation of a crumbling regime. Suffering 
from a horrendous humanitarian and economic record, exploiting the people's
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nationalism offered the best prospects for salvaging the government In the face 
of calls for democratization. As George Ouester notes,
“The recovery of the Malvinas Is viewed as an Issue of ptlde, 
with the ordinary people of Argentina sharing with their 
otherwise unrepresentative government an excessive attachment to 
issues of symbolism and national dignity.
Consequently, the junta's judgment was obscured and its diplomatic flexibility 
constrained. Much of the intelligence the government received was modified so 
as to tell the junta only what it wanted to hear, especially concerning the 
allegedly marginal possibility of British retaliation. Military intelligence 
consistently underestimated the British capacity to retake the Islands. 
Argentina's own analysis of the campaign recognized the misjudgments in 
Argentine policy and concluded that the campaign was “conceived and executed in 
an absolutely false framework.
The most serious miscalculation made was that Britain would not respond 
militarily to an invasion of the Falklands. By presenting a fait accompli, 
Argentina hoped to induce substantive British concessions at the negotiating 
table. What the junta failed to comprehend was that Britain could never allow 
such a precedent to he established. If Britain were to capitulate to coercive 
force on the Falklands, her interests ! Gibraltar, Belize, and elsewhere would 
be susceptible to similar challenges. Beyond that, Britain's credibility as an 
ally would be diminished by a perceived hesitancy to respond to military 
aggression. One look at Northern Ireland should have convinced the Junta that 
force inhibits, rather than aids, the resolution of territorial disputes. 
Argentina's resort to violence frustrated its own objective of Increasing the 
pace of negotiations. Any significant British concession would have validated
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the use of aggression as a diplomatic tool. The two themes which resounded 
throughout Britain during the campaign were that "aggression must not be allowed 
to succeed" and "freedom must be protected against dictatorship."^
Argentina had expected that woild opinion would be essentially receptive to 
an action aimed at eliminating one of the last vestiges of colonialism. The 
junta failed to understand that world opinion would classify Its actions as 
aggressive, regardless of the effort Argentina expended to insure that no 
casualties were inflicted. What appeared to Argentina as a relatively peaceful 
reoccupation of its own territoty was interpreted by international opinion as an 
unprovoked act of raw agression perpetrated against an essentially defenseless 
population by a brutal military dictatorship. Further, the action extended 
instability and armed conflict to yet another corner of the globe. Argentina's 
major error, then, was the failure to adequately assess the response of Britain 
and the world to the use of military force to resolve disputes. Had the junta 
been cognizant of this attitude, they would have realized that an invasion would 
obstruct, rather than promote, efforts to obtain the substantial concessions 
from Britain needed to restore some sense of legitimacy to military rule.
Although the invasion was largely motivated by Argentine domestic politics, 
neither the junta nor its intelligence community seriously contemplated the 
potential Influence of domestic politics on the British response. At the time 
of the invasion, the Thatcher government, too, was in serious political straits, 
due largely to economic problems. Indeed, an April 1982 poll revealed that 48% 
of the British population considered Margaret Thatcher the worst Prime Minister 
in British history.^® Therefore, to shrink from the Argentine challenge would 
have been political suicide: the people of Britain had suffered a national
humiliation and they expected their government to redress it. As one Cabinet
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member commented at the time, "I don't see how she (Thatcher) can survive if she 
shrinks from a military showdown.
Public pressure—in the forms of hostility directed at the regime and the 
passionate nationalism which the Falklands aroused—greatly influenced the 
Junta's decision to invade the Falkland Islands. Yet, the junta failed to 
consider how public pressure would affect the British response to an invasion. 
Nationalism was a driving force behind Argentine actions, yet the Junta 
overlooked its British counterpart. Admittedly, the British public had 
demonstrated a general apathy toward the Falkland Islands for many years. But 
few things could inflame nation.ilistic passion in Britain as readily as a 
blatant act of aggression directed against people of British origin living on 
British territory. For year, the British people had witnessed their nation's 
decline as an economic, political, and military power. The years of colonial 
withdrawal were painful. The British saw their institutions, customs, and 
investments abused and abandoned while the international status declined. But 
the Falklands were different: here was a distant people yearning to remain 
British and retain her aegis. While offering a distraction from the problems of 
Northern Ireland, Furopean Community relations, and economic decline, the 
Falklands crisis also provided an outlet for suppressed jingoism. When 
assessing the likelihood of a British military response to an invasion, the 
junta neglected to consider how military action can influence and transform 
attitudes, both within governments and in the public. "What reason did the 
Junta have for believing that Thatcher and her Government would be that much 
more able than they had been to Ignore the demands of what was certain to be 
aroused if not enraged public opinion?"^®
Argentina seriously underestimated the character of Britain's leader, Prime
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Minister Margaret Thatcher. Whether this was the result of Latin machismo, a 
mere misperception, or, most likely, a combination of both is a moot issue.
What is relevant is a consideration of the effect an accurate picture could have 
had on Argentine decision-making. The hope of compelling accelerated and 
substantive negotiations motivated the invasion, in great part. The Argentines 
had no desire—nor expectation—to go to war with Britain. Yet, a cursory 
analysis of Thatcher's personality—as reflected in her governing style—would 
have revealed to the junta that she is neither easily intimidated nor prone to 
compromise. Thatcher's handling of Britain's rather militant labor unions and 
dissent within her own party reflects her strong will and unyielding character. 
To believe that military force could coerce concessions from Margaret Thatcher 
was a monumental misjudgment. Margaret Thatcher was an "Iron Lady" long before 
the Falklands Campaign made this label her trademark.
As well as underestimating the will of the British government, the 
Argentines also miscalculated Britain's ability to respond militarily to an 
invasion. The continual contraction of the surface fleet and of Britain's 
out-of-area capabilities had not gone unnoticed in Buenos Aires. General 
Galtlerl was personally doubtful of Britain's capacity to actively defend the 
Falkland Islands. However, some Argentine Intelligence reports exaggerated the 
extent of Britain's military contraction and deficiencies, probably in an 
attempt to please superiors.British success in the Falklands campaign 
manifested the Inaccuracy of Argentine assessments, although those evaluations 
of Britain's military capabilities would have been more truly reflective in a 
few months when further British reductions were scheduled to go into effect. 
Still, a better determination of British strength might have promoted a more
cautious attitude in Buenos Aires
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Finally, Argentina wholly miscalculated the position of the United States 
in the conflict# The neutrality which Buenos Aires expected was short-lived.
The Junta, in so doing, misinterpreted American strategic Interests and 
commitments. American/Argentlne relations had warmed markedly under the Reagan 
Administration, and Galtterl was especially liked by the Administration. Reagan 
sought Argentine cooperation and support for his policies <n Central America.
In return, Reagan Increased arms sales and aid levels from those of the previous 
administration. However, American ties with Britain were stronger. Britain is 
one of the United States' longest-standing allies, and these ties were 
reinforced by the common ideological ties between Reagan and Thatcher. While 
ties with Argentina promote regional interests, Britain, s b  a member of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, represents a key factor in America's larger 
strategic interests. While Central America is an Important political issue, 
East-West relations represent Washington's most critical foreign policy area. 
(Indeed, the Reagan Administration sees the Central American crisis as merely an 
outgrowth of East-West competition.) Of the two, alienation of Argentina would 
least threaten American interests. What is more, America could never let 
Britain lose such a conflict-failure to recognize this in Argentina was an 
extremely serious miscalculation. The defeat of a major NATO member by a 
developing country would not be tolerated by an American administration Intent 
upon increasing its own strength—and that of NATO's—vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union. Also, with Cruise and Pershing missile deployments in Europe just twenty 
months away, Reagan did not want to jeopardize their installation, as he 
described it, over "that little ice-cold bunch of land down t h e r e . F i n a l l y ,  
sentiment in Congress and the public at large was distinctly pro-British and 
Reagan was not inclined to challenge this consensus. Had Argentina more
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accurately understood what the American position would be in such a conflict, 
the knowledge would have had a strong deterrent value. The generals may have 
been desperate, but they were not foolhardy; when the United States announced 
Its support for Britain, Argentina's defeat was virtually assured.
The central assumptions upon which Argentine policy was based were largely 
erroneous. The junta wholly miscalculated the response of Britain, the United 
States, and even world opinion to Its actions. Further, Argentina would not 
concede to the British government and public the same passions which had molded 
Argentine policy. Buenos Aires also failed to comprehend that much of world 
opinion would judge Its actions as nothing more than gunboat diplomacy and Its 
rhetoric as an attempt to have the end (destroy a perpetuation of colonialism) 
justify the means. Finally, Argentina displayed a myopic understanding of 
American strategic Interests. Because of these mlsjudgments, Argentina was 
unable to achieve Its goal of substantive progress in sovereignty negotiations. 
Instead, Argentina was defeated In a campaign it never wanted nor expected to 
fight, and, as a result of defeat, found itself farther than ever from regaining 
the Falkland Islands.
The Falkland Islands campaign began through a series of miscalculations and 
misinterpretlons. Neither country wanted to be Involved in a military campaign, 
but their miscalculations drew them Into It. As Philip Windsor describes It, 
"...the two countries went to war because each concluded that the other was not 
really prepared to do so."^ Britain sent the wrong signals to Buenos Aires 
and, at the same time, grossly misread the indications of Impending military 
activity emanating from Argentina. Argentina, for Its part, based Its policies 
on a number of wholly unsound assumptions. Unfortunately, these errors resulted 
In tragedy when men began dying because of political mlsjudgments. What Is
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worse, when the conflict ended, Britain and Argentina were farther than ever 
from resolving the dispute* Britain found itself more committed to the 
Islands— economi ally, politically, and militarily—than it ever wanted to be* 
Argentina not only found Itself a long way from regaining sovereignty, but also 
saw all the efforts that had been expended to Improve relations with the 
Islanders destroyed*
The mistakes that led to this conflict need to be understood If either side 
wants to ensure that the tragedy Is not repeated* Until diplomatic negotiations 
are able to resolve this dispute, both Britain and Argentina will have to manage 
the peace and practice crisis deterrence more efficiently than previously, but 
these measures can be effective only if the errors that Initially led to 
conflict are understood* Until Britain and Argentina come to understand each 
others' goals and motivations concerning the Falkland Islands, there can be no 
communication, and an ability to communicate is essential for the successful 
conduct of negotiations*
CHAPTER FOUR:
Sho r t-Ter m Pro spec t s for Peace
The military campaign for the Falkland Islands was simply the physical 
manifestation of a long-simmering diplomatic dispute: the military conflict was
just one battle in a larger political war* Indeed, the Campaign intensified the 
controversy over the Falkland Islands* What had been, at best, a secondary 
matter for the British and Argentine governments suddenly became a primary 
political issue* The Campaign was both the coup de grace of the Argentine 
military junta and the saving grace of Margaret Thatcher and her Conservative 
Party.
International Calls for Progress
Armed conflict brings with it greater international pressure for a 
resolution of the dispute* In the present age, the frighteningly destructive 
capabilities of modern weaponry and the already fragile superpower balance cause 
the world community to view with serious concern the eruption of hostilities 
anywhere on the globe* These calls for compromise are focused more Intensely on 
the United Kingdom, for its government is expected to demonstrate magnanimity in 
victory* Yet Margaret Thatcher has shown markedly little willingness to 
negotiate and compromise; she adamantly refuses to even contemplate a discussion 
of the core issue: sovereignty* At the same time, those who backed Britain in
the conflict—mainly Western nations—are finding it increasingly difficult to 
continue their support* At the beginning of the Campaign, Argentina's
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culpability was blatant: A brutal military dictatorship had Invaded an
essentially defenseless territory. But now, nearly three years have elapsed 
since Britain reoccupied the Islands and, In December, 1983, a democratically 
elected government—headed by President Rdul Alfonsln—replaced tne military 
junta In Buenos Aires# Still, there has been no progress towards even 
normalizing relations, let along negotiating a solution# Meanwhile, support for 
the British in the international community waned# In reference to declining 
support for Britain in the United Nations on the Falklands issue, the former 
British United Nations Ambassador, Sir Anthony Parsons, conceded that
With the (Argentine) government having changed to one of 
democratic respectability and the memory of the invasion 
beginning to fade it will certainly become more difficult for us 
to maintain such a good record 1 j the General Assembly as we have 
done in the last two years.*
The Argentine Approach to NegotiaHons
While the pressures to resolve this conflict Increased, the capacity of 
each government to make concessions decreased# Although the failures of the 
campaign were blamed on the military junta, the Argentine people still feel a 
great allegiance to those who died during the fighting# The democratic 
government shares its predecessor's commitment to regaining the Falklands; 
however, Alfonsln and his government have wholly disavowed the use of force to 
achieve their goal# The Argentine Foreign Minister affirmed this policy when,
In January, 1984 he promised that Argentina "shall not take the initiative to 
recover (the Falklands) by force*..we shall only use all our diplomatic 
possibilities."^
The British Approach to Negotiations
Aa far as the British are concerned, a case of selective amnesia has set-in
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concerning their earlier willingness to negotiate sovereignty. Now that the 
military conflict is over, the government has sought to invest the Islands with 
a status and value sufficient to Justify both the campaign effort and the 
government's subsequent investment in the tslands's welfare. Thatcher's 
attitude has been that "‘If they're (the Falklands) worth fighting for, they must 
be worth keeping."^
Thus, the government’s policies have provided the Islands with significant 
military support and economic aid. Thatcher has invested 215 million pounds^ in 
the construction of an airport which can accomodate long-haul, wide-body Jets 
(both civilian and military) flown from Europe* (The airport is due to open in 
April, 1985—ahead of schedule.)
The cost of garrisoning the Falklands represents 2.52! of Britain's defense 
budget.^ For a country whose defense is almost wholly NATO oriented—only 5% of 
the defense budget is allocated for non-NATO tasks*'—this constitutes a 
significant diversion of Britain's defense effort. The British government 
asserts that additions to the defense budget fund the Falkland Islands' garrison 
and, thus, money is not diverted from other defense needs. However, considering 
the government's announcement that, shortly, it will be incapable of meeting 
NATO'* goal of a 5% real Increase in defense expenditure annually by each member 
nation, the funds being Invested in the Falklands' garrison become an 
increasingly expensive drain on NATO resources. If that 2.5% currently going bo 
the Falkland** could go to NATO, Britain might he able to avoid reneging on its 
obligations to the Alliance. The Islands also are receiving development and 
reconstruction aid, so that the grand total of British expenditure on the 
Falklands' represents nearly 2 million pounds, spent over three years, for each 
Falkland lalanda faeUlyl7 a massive investment greatly inhibits the
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government's flexibility in negotiations; they now have much more to lose# 
Megaphone Diplomacy
The course of negotiations since the end of the Campaign reflects the dual 
nature of the pressures on both governments* Both Buenos Aires and London 
desire talks and a normalization of relations* Yet, the extent of each 
government's investment in the Islands—whether it is measured in human lives or 
in budgetary allocations—diminishes the desire of either side compromise.
In response to a congratulatory telegram from Margaret Thatcher or the occasion 
of his inauguration, Argentine President RAul Alfonsin recalled an English 
colloquialism: "Where there's a will, there's a way*" Unfortunately, the will
displayed by both sides thus far has appeared as more an eagerness to have their 
own demands met than as an inclination to compromise*
The character of Argentine/British relations since Argentina's surrender on 
14 June 1982 can be described best as "full of sound and fury, signifying 
nothing*" Both sides have issued warnings, propagated statements, set 
conditions, and declared intentions with regularity. Yet, amazingly little 
communication has passed between the two governments as a result of this, as it 
is often described, "megaphone diplomacy". Three years have elapsed since the 
Campaign and relations have not been normalized yet nor has an end to 
hostilities been declared. Still, some confidence-building measures have been 
enacted and contact between government officials at a variety of different 
levels has occurred.
The Course of Relations in_ 1982
Since the end of the conflict, Britain has expressed a willingness, through 
the International Red Cross, either to return the Argentine dead from the 
Falklands or to permit, under the auspices of the International Red Cross, a
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visit to the Islands by relatives of the dead*® Argentina, however, has 
demonstrated little interest in accepting the British offer*
Immediately after the close of the Campaign, General Reynaldo Blgnone 
replaced General Galtieri as President of Argentina* Until the election of a 
democratic government in October, 1983, the Argentine junta perpetuated Its 
bellicose approach to the Falklands dispute* On A January 1983, for example, 
Senor Francisco Manrique, warned that "One must not discount a second armed 
conflict over the I s l a n d s . T h e  present government in Argentina disowns such 
pronouncements as meaningless!y provocative, and has advocated a peaceful 
resolution of the Issue* Still, the threatening noises emanating from Buenos 
Aires prior to December, 1983, partially explain the lack of progress in 
normalizing relations during that period*
On 18 June 1982, the Argentines recognized that a de facto ceasefire was in 
effect, which allowed Britain to repatriate Argentine prisonors-of war.*^
Still, there has never been an official, de jure cessation of hostilities by the 
Argentines, much to the consternation of the British* The Argentines feel that, 
since hostilities were never actually declared, an official cessation is 
unnecessary* The Argentines frequently cite, in support, the failure of the 
British to announce a ceasefire at the end of the Suez conflict in 1956*
Instead, the United Kingdom recognized the authority of United Nations'” 
pronouncements on the conflict* Since the democratic government assumed power 
in 1983, the tone of Argentine statements has been markedly less caustic.** 
Indeed, the Argentines elected a man President who had denounced the junta's 
invasion, at the time, as "an illegal act by an illegitimate government in a 
just c a u s e * While the British have noted this change in tone, they remain 
adamantly committed to hearing Argentina declare an end to hostilities*
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On 21 June 1982, the European Economic Community lifted the sanctions which 
were imposed upon Argentina at the beginning of the conflict. This was 
followed, on 12 July 1982, with the termination of American sanctions on 
Argentina. Finally, in September, Britain and Argentina agreed to suspend the 
financial restrictions each had imposed on the other.^
On 22 July 1982, Britain lifted the exclusion zone around the Falklands and 
replaced it with a protection zone. Argentine warships and military aircraft 
■till were prohibited from entering and civilian vehicles could enter only with 
British permission. The Argentines have not, as yet, sought such permission for 
either ships or aircraft.
The Course of Negotiations in 1983
January, 1983 saw British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher visit the 
Falkland Islands. During this trip, her allegiance to the Islands increased 
dramatically, a critical factor in her present unyielding stance on 
negotiations. A Gallup poll released the same month In The Dally Telegraph 
revealed that 63% of Conservatives advocated efforts to reach an agreement with 
Argentina.** On 5 January, the Argentine Ambassador to the United Nations, 
Carlos Muniz, announced that Argentina would press its claim to the Falklands 
through various international fora, such as the Organization of American States, 
the Non-Aligned Movement, and the United Nations. Noting the extent of 
international support for Argentina's claim, he commented that ‘'Great Britain 
may take its time to arrive at this decision (to grant Argentine sovereignty) 
but in the end it will have to yield to the will of the majority of the 
countries of the world."**
Following American Intelligence reports which predicted an Argentine 
harrassment campaign against the Falklands, Britain Increased the daily number
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of RAF Phantom flights and beefed-up its defenses. The intelligence reports 
alleged that Argentina planned to launch commando raids against the Falklands 
and to attack British aircraft outside the 200-mlle exclusion zone as a response 
to Thatcher's Falklands visit. The Argentine government labeled the charges as 
"crazy" and as an attempt by the British government to divert attention from the 
Franks committee's report on the 1982 Campaign.^ The following day, on the 
20th of January, the Argentine government announced that it would not declare an 
end to hostilities until Britain displayed a willingness to negotiate on the 
Islands.^
During March, 1983, a Non-Aligned Summit meeting was held in New Delhi. In
the closing declaration, the organization expressed its support for Argentina's
position: "The Conference reaffirms that the Malvinas (Falkland Islands), South
Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands are an Integral part of the Latin
1 AAmerican region."1
The House of Commons Select Committee on Defence released a report on the 
future defense of the Falkland Islands on 12 May 1983.^ In the report, the 
Committee noted that the failure to procure an official cessation of hostilities 
from Argentina had serious implications for the Islands' future. The report 
also recognized that the short-term prospects for negotiations were poor due 
both to the continued hostility of Argentine military rulers and to Margaret 
Thatcher's unshakeable commitment to supporting the Islanders' wishes. Said the 
report,
There can be...no certainty that fighting for the Falkland 
Islands and Dependencies will not be renewed. • .We must conclude 
that over the next few years the dispute between Her Majesty's 
Government and Argentina as to the future status of the Falklands 
will remain as insoluble as ever*
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A general election was held in Britain in June, 1983 and Margaret Thatcher 
and her Conservatives were returned to power with the largest majority since 
World War II. The large majority ensures that the next election will not be 
forced prematurely by a lost vote in the House of Commons. The Falkland 
Islanders were granted the aegis of Margaret Thatcher's hardline approach to the 
Falklands issue for another five years. With her majority (of around 200 
votes), the potential for parliamentarians to pressure for change via the voting 
lobby is severely curtailed. If Margaret Thatcher wants to maintain her 
resolute attitude on the Falklands issue, Westminister can do little to force a 
compromise. The British Nationality Act of 1983 reflected this commitment by 
granting the Falkland Islanders British citIsenship, something denied them two 
year previously.
In September, 1983, the first in a series of meetings between Members of 
the British Parliament and of the Argentine Congress was held at the University 
of Maryland, under the auspices of the Center for International Development.
This forum was uniquely conducive to a frank exchange of views because those in 
attendance were policy-influencers rather than formal policy-makers. 
Consequently, the progress of the Conference was not Impeded by official 
rhetoric and political promulgations. This first conference investigated 
Argentina's goals concerning sovereignty and noted that the symbolism of 
sovereignty (l.e. the presence of the Argentine flag on the Islands) was as 
desirable as its actual exercise. Therefore, a solution to the dispute which 
allowed a symbolic display of Argentine sovereignty while perpetuating British 
administration to guarantee the Islanders' Interests might represent a feasible 
alternative to the present stalemate In Anglo-Argentine relations.
Argentina; Democracy Revisited
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The 30th of October, 1983 marked a watershed In contemporary Argentine 
politics: genuine democratic elections were held In which the military's
election of RAul Alfonsln of the Radical Party as President of Argentina* 
Alfonsin had denounced the Junta's decision to invade the Falklands in 1982 and 
his election marked Argentina's return to a reliance upon the negotiating 
process to resolve the Falklands dispute* On the day after the Argentine 
elections, Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office Issued a statement 
welcoming the return of democracy to Argentina, a sentiment which was echoed In 
Margaret Thatcher's reply to a Parliamentary Question on 1 November* On 7 
November, Thatcher outlined the prospect for talks with the new government:
Alfonsin was Inaugurated as President on the 10th of December* In a 
message delivered through the Swiss Protecting Power (Brasil Is serving as 
Argentina's Interest representative until the two resume diplomatic 
negotiations), Thatcher commented that "Today brings new hope to your country•" 
In his Inaugural address, Alfonsin referred directly to the Anglo-Argentine 
dispute:
candidate was defeated resoundingly*22 The outcome of the voting was the
•••I am willing to enter into talks* We want good commercial 
relations, diplomatic relations, we want norma 
am not entering Into talks about sovereignty• "
"Regarding the lsssue of the Malvinas (Falklands), South 
Georgias, and South Sandwich Islands, our unyielding objective is 
and will always be the full recovery and the definltve 
integration of these islands to our sovereign national 
territory.• our position in this regard is inflexible*"2*
The critical difference, however, was that now the Argentine cause would be 
advanced by peaceful means and diplomacy*
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Negotiations In 1984
Britain opened the new year and greeted the new Argentine government with 
specific proposals for normalizing relations, Issued via the Swiss embassy In 
Ruenos Aires on 26 January 1984. Although the message was confidential, the 
proposals undoubtedly covered the resumption of direct air flights between 
Britain and Argentina; the removal of Argentine supervisory personnel (inter 
ventores) from British businesses in Argentina (these were supposed to be 
removed when economic restriction were lifted in September, 1982); the 
repatriation of the Argentine dead or else a visit to the Islands by their 
relatives; and the curbing of restrictions on economic and cultural contacts# 
The note also probably Included a reiteration of Britain's unwillingness to 
suspend the protection zone or resume diplomatic relations until Argentina 
offlcally declared an end to hostilities# Thatcher reaffirmed this conviction 
in her answer to a Parliamentary Question on the 30th of January:
"We do not envisage keeping the 50 nautclal mile protection zone 
around the Falkland Islands indefinitely, but we will not lift it 
prematurely# We need to be fully satisfied that Argentina 
renounces the future use of force, and we have noted recent 
Argentine statements that they Intend to pursue their claim by 
peaceful means •
The proposals were rejected by Argentina on 3 February because Britain refused 
to participate In talks which included the question of sovereignty on the 
agenda#
The beginning of the year also saw the Falkland Islands garrison reduced 
from a high alert to a more moderate—and sustainable—level# The British 
Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Heseltine, visited the Falklands early 
in 1984# He arrived on the Islands at the end of a record eighteen hour
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non-stop flight In a RAF Nimrod, thus demonstrating Britain's capacity to 
rapidly reinforce the Islands by air. During his visit, Heseltlne broke with 
precedent and stated that an Argentine declaration of the end of hostilities was 
no longer requisite for a dialogue to commence. However, this was never 
repeated by other government officials.
On February 1, during a visit to Venezuela, President Alfonsin delineated a 
six-point plan for rebuilding relations. He proposed that: Argentina and
Britain initiate contacts through their United Nations missions; attempts be 
made to restore relations to the status quo ante bellum; talks be conducted 
within the framework of the United Nations1' resolutions; Britain lift its 
exclusion zone and freeze its fortification of the Islands; a United Nations 
peacekeeping force be considered as a means of guaranteeing the security of the 
Islands; and the implementation of these steps would effect a de jure cessation 
of hostilities and a normalization of relations.
Britain responded to the Argentine proposals with a statement Issued the 
following day by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The response clearly 
rejected the idea of a United Nations peacekeeping force: "there is no role for
the United Nations In the protection of the Islands." Instead, Britain asserted 
that the Improvement and eventual normalization of bilateral relations was the 
key to ending the dispute.
Charging that the Royal Air Force was harassing—"buzzing"—Argentine 
fishing vesBesl outside the protection zone; Argentina protested to the United 
Nations. The protest mace in mid-February concerned an Incident alleged to have 
taken place on the 5th of November and the 24th of December. ^  At the same 
time, an Argentine diplomat extended an invitation for Labour Members of 
Parliament to visit Argentina.
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In a memorandum Issued to the Hosue of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on 
the 15th of February, the Falkland Islands government proposed that Britain 
normalize relations with Argentina, provided that sovereignty over the Falklands 
was not a matter for discussion. The memorandum suggested that after a period 
of normalization and reconstruction, then "...the Falkland Islands Government 
and people could asess their position In the framework of improved International 
relations and decide how they wanted to...exercise their right to
self-determination."^
On 17 February, Argentina delivered a confidential response to the British 
proposals of 26 January. The central point of contention was Britain's refusal 
to disucss sovereignty and Argentina's insistence that the subject not be 
excluded from talks. One Argentine diplomat told the Sunday Times that "We 
cannot leave sovereignty out of account In the final solution, but it could be 
first or last on the agenda." Argentina, then, appeared willing to postpone 
sovereignty discussions temporarily, so long as their eventual inclusion in 
talks was not precluded. On the 19th of February, Argentine Foreign Minister 
Dante Caputo noted that "..we cannot accept that the beginning of talks may 
imply a tacit drop of our sovereignty c l a i m s . T h e  14 March issue of La 
Macton published the text of the Argentine response, much to the dismay of 
government officials. The text described the British proposals as a "positive 
step", but suggested that such Issues as the suspension of the protection zone, 
the termination of British fortification of the Islands, and the withdrawal of 
all nuclear weapons from the area also be Included in discussion. Finally, the 
reply stressed the "extreme Importance" which Argentina attached to relations 
with the United Kingdom and its consequent desire "...to peacefully end the
dispute on the Malvinas Islands, the South Georgias, and the South Sandwich
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Islands".^
On 23 March, Osvaldo De Stefanis, the zealous leader of Argentina's Center 
for Volunteers for the Fatherland, landed surreptitiously on the Falklands and 
hoisted an Argentine flag, buried three rosaries, took pictures, and left. "I 
wanted to let the world know that the Malvinas (Falklands) are still Argentine 
and that we want them back by peaceful means," De Stefanls stated, in 
justification of his act tons.^ Both London and Buenos Aires downplayed the 
event as neither wanted the incident to inhibit attempts to improve relations.
On 6 April, Britain delivered a confidential response to the Argentine 
letter of 17 February, tn the letter, Britain essentially reiterated the 
proposals outlined in its original communlcalton of 26 January. The response 
also is believed to have detailed the preconditions for Britain's lifting of the 
protection zone, the main requirement being an Argentine cessation of 
hostilities. The Argentine newspaper, El Clarln, described these proposals aa 
"unacceptable and unsatisfactory" in its 15 April 1984 issue.
During a trip to Paris, the Argentine Foreign Minister Dante Caputo, 
advocated a "small steps" approach to improving Anglo-Argentine relations. 
Through such confidence-building measures as the removal of the protection zone 
or a halt in the construction of the Mount Pleasant airfield, Caputo felt thaf a 
foundation for talks could be established. He further proposed a series of 
informal talks with an open agenda (l.e. neither specifically including nor 
excluding the issue of sovereignty). His comments reflected an Aigentlne desire 
to end the political stalemate and to effect substantive progress in 
Anglo-Argentine relations. "The important thing," Caputo stressed, "is to get 
around the table...• I am optimistic about the capacity for dialogue of 
civilized governments The British government had suggested earlier that
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negotiations would be a piecemeal process. On the 20th of February, a Foreign 
Office spokesman stated that **We. •.see the profess sb one of step-by-step 
diplomacy *"^
April also saw the second meeting of British Members of Parliament and 
Argentine Congressmen at the University of Maryland's Center for International 
Development* While many Issues were discussed, special attention was focused on 
how the Campaign's success affected Britain's self-image* Considering the 
difficulty of persuading Margaret Thatcher and RAul Alfonsin to sit down 
together, lower-level contacts like those made at the Maryland conference are 
the foundation upon which Improved relations can he built* The participants 
avoid becoming entangled in official rhetoric and are able to confront the issue 
directly and in a forthright manner*
Argentine Foreign Minister, Dante Caputo, on 6 May, revealed Argentine 
dlssatlsifactlon with the British note of 6 April when he commented that "we are 
not at all in agreement with the British answer" to the Argentine proposals of 
17 February.^ Subsequent statements reaffirmed Argentina's commitment to 
resolving the conflict throught diplomatic means only* On 9 May, Members of the 
House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs met with the Argentine 
representative to the United Nations in New York as part of the Committee's 
investigation of future options for the Falkland Islands*
On 7 June, President Alfonsin signed a pact with seventeen political 
parties in an effort to gain opposition support in confronting Argentina's 
problems and in preserving its fledgling democracy* The agreement was 
especially significant because the Peronist Party—with its large union 
backing—signed the pact* By signing the agreement, these parties demonstrated 
their support for Alfonsin's efforts to negotiate on the Falklands issue and
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their shared concern over Britain's Falklands policy. These convictions 
appeared in the twelfth part of the accord:
The Argentine Republic condemns and deplores the notion of 
"Fortress Falklands' and the so called "exclusion zone".
Diplomatic action will be intensified, searching for (a) peaceful 
solution i:hat should acknowldge our rights over these portions of 
national territory."^4
While this statement reflected the hard-line nationalism of the opposition 
parties, the agreement demonstrated multilateral support for advancing 
Argentina's claim to the Islands in a peaceful—rather than militant—manner. 
Changing Attitude in Parliament
On the 8th of June, the Falkland Islands were the subject of the House of 
Commons' adjournment debate. That the issue was no longer in the forefront of 
most Members' minds was reflected in the small turnout for the debate* (The 
scheduling of the debate for a Friday undoubtedly ' ounted for a great many 
absences, as well, as Members returned to their constituencies for the weekend.) 
Since the nationalist elan of the campaign has worn-off, many Members of 
Parliament—on both sides of the Chamber—have recognized the immense burden 
that Thatcher'8 Falklands policy places on the nation and, more specifically, on 
their own constituents. Without the specter of a fascist dictatorship in Buenos 
Aires, accommodation with the Argentines becomes much more feasible politically* 
A Harris poll conducted in February revealed that 43% of the British population 
supported a transfer of sovereignty to Argentina, with only 3% more opposed and
4 e
it 11% were undecided. While few Members of Parliament advocate abandoning 
the Islands without any consideration or guarantees for the Islanders' welfare, 
a pragmatic assessment of costs and benefits reveals to many Members the 
impractlcallty of present policy. One Member of Parliament, while qestionlng a
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witness before the Foreign Affairs Commltte, revealed the exasperation many feel 
with the policy of "Fortress Falklands":
How do I explain to my 50,000 electors with 20 percent 
unemployment, the need for roads in my constituency,.., and the 
need to provide jobs and coal mines, that many billions of their 
money has to be spent on 1,800 people?"3®
With Britain facing serious economic problems—including a weak pound and high 
unemployemnt—Members are finding it increasingly difficult to justify the 
Oovernment's expense of 1.28 million pounds on each Falkland Islander since 
April, 1982,3  ^and they are anxious to curb future levels of expenditure.
The debate on 8 June revealed not only increasing concern for the 
exorbitant cost of "Fortess Falklands", but also the emergence of a bipartisan 
consensus on the need for progress in negotiations. With the advent of 
democracy to Argentina, many Members feel the time is propitious for reaching a 
settlement that is satisfactory to the Argentines and which protects the rights 
of the Falkland Islanders. Denis Healey, Labour's shadow Foreign Secretary, 
stated during a television interview in February, that the British .should be 
prepared to talk about transferring sovereignty and the conditions under which 
this might happen."3® The leader of the Liberal Party concurred in this 
sentiments "I don't know whether it is wise to exclude sovereignty in the way 
that Mrs. Thatcher keeps insisting on doing."39 During the debate on 8 June, 
the opinions expressed on both sides of the House reflected the emerging 
bipartisan consensus. A Labour Member argued that **we should try to secure a 
solution that would be in the interests of the British public, the Falkland 
Islanders and—dare I say it?—the Argentine population."*0 Later, a 
Conservative Member recalled an appropriate quotation of Winston Churchill's in
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support of his pleas for progress in negotiations: "Agree with thine adversary
quickly whilst thou art in the way with him*"** The government's response 
(presented by Minister of State, Ray Whitney) to the debate, however, indicated 
no changes were planned in its approach to relations with Argentina*
On the lith of June, Argentina celebrated a national holiday dedicated to 
the reaffirmation of Argentine claims to the Falklands. In a speech marking the 
holiday, President Alfonsin charged the British with "inflexibility and 
unwillingness to ne go tia te*Earlier, Alfonsin had described the status of 
Anglo-Argentine relations concerning the Falklands as "bad, very bad*"^ The 
apparent inability of the two governments to find even a common ground upon 
which to base negotiations was frustrating officials on both sides of the 
dispute*
Mid-June saw the arrival of the Argentine President in Madrid, Spain. One 
outcome of this visit was the 'Madrid Declaration", promulgated on the 13th of 
June. This document was an expression of shared Argentine/Spanlsh concerns and 
values. As both governments are Involved in territorial disputes with Britain, 
the Declaration Included a section recognizing diplomacy as the sole legitimate 
instrument of resolving these dlputes
Spain and Argentina are the victims of an anachronistic colonial 
situation and support their respective claims to sovereignty over 
the Malvinas Islands and Gibraltar, to restore the integrity of 
their national territories by peaceful means in accordance with 
the pertinent U.N. resolutions*
The following day, in response to a Parliamentary Question, Prime Minster 
Margaret Thatcher responded to the issue of the Declaration: "Naturally we take
exception to the terms of the joint communique in so far as it distorts the true 
position of Gibraltar and the Falklands*"^
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In a speech on the 13th of June, President Alfonsln announced that 
Argentina would not declare an end to hostilities unless Britain ceased 
fortification of the Islands and lifted the protection zone* He also expressed 
concern that British policy might transform the region into an arena for 
East-West competition, as occurred in the Indian Ocean.^
From 2*> June to 1 July, three Members of Parliament visited Argentina as 
guests of the Argentine Senate* The three were Cyril Townsend (Conservative, 
House of Commons), George Foulkes (labour, House of Commons), and Lord Wayland 
Kennett (Social Democratic Party, House of Lords). During their visit, the Idea 
of Argentina declaring an end to hostilities and Britain lifting the protection 
zone simultaneously was discussed and was warmly received by the Argentines*
The delegates also discovered a "bursting wish" among Argentines for a 
normalization of relations with Britain.^ The talks are widely believed to 
have cleared the path for the subsequent meeting of British and Argentine 
representatives In Berne* At the end of the Britons' visit to Argentina, their 
trip was described as a "gesture of good will which promotes a dialogue between 
the two countries on the more-than-a-century-old conflict on the Malvinas 
Islands."48
On 2 July, at the United Nations Conference on World Fishing, the Argentine 
Undersecretary of Marine Resources, Hector Traverso, condemned Britain's 
maintenance of the protection zone as an illegal and unjust barrier to the 
development of Argentina's marine resources* Argentina charged that the 
continued enforcement of the zone constrained attempts to formulate an agreement 
on national fishing rights and that their actions were detrimental to the 
preservation and conservation of animal resources* Argentina claimed that the 
maintenance of the zone had resulted In no less than two Instances of harassment
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by British airplanes of Argentine fishing boats. In their address to the 
conference! the British made no reference to the problem of the protection zone 
and relations with Argentina. ^
In an address opening the Tenth World Baptist Youth Conference in Buenos 
Aires on 11 July, President Alfonsln appeared to have moderated his approach to 
talks with Britain. The hard-line pronouncements of previous months were 
abandoned temporarily as Alfonsln declared that Argentina "...Is suffering from 
a disease! which Is arrogance," and that to cure this disease, his government 
"...is seeking and will achieve a reconciliation...with Great Britain concerning 
the South Atlantic conflict."
Face to Face at Berne
For the first time since the 1982 outbreak of hostilities, high-level 
officials from London and Buenos Aires met for direct talks. The meeting took 
place over two days—the 18th and 19th of July—and was held in Berne, 
Swltserland under the auspices of the Swiss Protecting Power with Brasilian 
representatives also In attendance. While the talks lasted their scheduled two 
days, the outcome was disappointing. The meeting ended in mutual recrimination 
without any progress made towards ending the dlploamtlc stalemate. Indeed, the 
failure of the first direct contact between the two governments to effect any 
positive results boded poorly for hopes of any immediate Improvement In 
relations. ?he cause of the talks" failure was the fundamental incongruity of 
the two governments" approaches to the process of normalizing relations. The 
Argentines believe that talks which completely Ignore the sovereignty dispute 
are fruitless. As Foreign Minister Caputo states, "...to deny the nature of the 
conflict is to deny the conflict Itself.... No type of negotiation, If it is to 
be taken seriously and responsibly, can Ignore the nature of the conflict.
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Still, the Argentines have expressed a willingness to discuss other Issues 
first—i.e. the normalization of relations—so long as the sovereignty Issue is 
not wholly excluded from an agenda. To this end, Argentina has continually 
asked that talks be conducted with an open agenda—as was supposed to occur in 
Berne.
At the Berne talks, Argentina wanted to discuss "the mechanisms that would 
allow for the future discussion of Issues of substance i.e# sovereignty."-*2 
The Argentines accepted that the sovereignty Issue could not be resolved 
Immediately, but felt that discussing the steps which would allow for the future 
consideration of the Issue was as worthwhile a concern as normalizing current 
relations. The British, however, have been wholly inflexible In their refusal to 
discuss sovereignty or even to consider the steps that would lead to a future 
discussion of the issue.
The British blame the failure of the talks on Argentina's insistence that
M
sovereignty not be excluded from discussion. J When the British Insisted that 
sovereignty could not be discussed in any form during the talks, the Argentines' 
felt the meeting had become pointless—an exercise in treating symptoms while 
Ignoring the disease. International opinion generally concurred with the 
Argentine view; Britain was widely accused of unwarranted Intransigence, both at 
home and abroad. The talks ended with the Issue of a joint Brazlllan-Swiss 
communique which revealed the crux of the dispute:
The British side said that Her Majesty's Government was not 
prepared to enter Into discussions on the issue of 
sovereignty...The Argentine side stated that It was not prepared 
to discuss such issues (as normalization of relations) for a long 
time If there is no discussion of the manner In which the subject 
of sovereignty is to be discussed. *
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The British approached the negotiation process with a short-term view concerned 
only with a normalization of relations while the Argentines were preoccupied 
with discussing the long-term question of sovereignty, without which they saw 
little advantage in repairing diplomatic relations. The House of Commons Foreign 
Affairs Commitee ageeed that the failure of the Berne talks uncovered the 
’fundamental incompatabllity of the Argentine and British approaches to the 
means of re-establishing relations.
The Aftermath of Berne
In an interview with The Financial Times on 8 August 1984, the Argentine 
Foreign Minister stated that he had no expectations of an immediate follow-up on 
the Berne meeting so long as Britain ignored the core of the dispute—the 
sovereignty Issue. The same month saw clear demonstrations of Argentina's 
commitment to curbing the power of Its military and, consequently, of 
Argentina's reliance upon diplomatic methods to resolve the Falklands dispute.
On the 15th of August, the Argentine Defense Minister announced that he would 
gradually abolish conscription.^ This measure was followed In January, 1985 by 
a 50% reduction in the defense budget
On 24 September, President Alfonsin addressed the United Nations General 
Assembly and referred to Argentina's dispute with Britain over the Falklands.
He made mention of British "Intransigence1* In negotiations and reiterated 
Argentina's commitment to regain the Islands through peaceful means. Alfonsin 
repeated his concerns over British fortification of the Falklands and described 
the process as .threatening the interests and stability of the entire area 
and constituting a dangerous Intrusion of the East-West conflict into the 
region."
Two days later, Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, presented
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the Brittsh side of the dispute to the General Assembly* He asserted the right 
of the Falklands' inhabitants to self-determination* He also asserted that the 
military forces on the Islands posed no threat to other countries and, indeed, 
were only there for defensive purposes* Finally, he expressed Britain's desire 
to Improve relations between the two governments: "The only way forward is to
find a way of taking such practical steps as will enable confidence to be 
re-established between our two peoples."
During October, statements made by government officials in both Britain and 
Argentina reflected the continued inability of the two governments to find a 
common basis for negotiations* On 11 October, Foreign Office Minister of State, 
Lady Young, reiterated British unwillingness to discuss sovereignty: "We do not
believe that it is realistic to insist that Britain and Argentina should begin 
tackling the most sensitive issue between us and the one on which our positions 
are diametrically opposed and quite incompatible*" Later, during a trip to 
Italy, Argentine President Alfonsin stated that "I do not think there can be any 
new alternative to the proposals that have already been made*"^®
The United Nations General Assembly passed an Argentine sponsored 
resolution on the Falkland Islands on 1 November* The resolution passed by a 
large majority (89 to 9, with 54 abstentions), reflecting Increased 
international Impatience with Britain's unwillingness to discuss the central 
issue of sovereignty with Argentina* The resolution called upon Britain and 
Argentina to resume negotiations on their differences, including the sovereignty 
dispute, and requested the Secretary-General to continue in the use of his good 
offices to help facilitate contacts between the two governments*
On 27 November, Britain agreed to discuss with Spain the issue of 
sovereignty over Gibraltar* The following day, in response to a Parliamentary
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Question, the Foreign Secretary denied that this decision had any relevant 
implications for the Falklands dispute* The Secretary suggested that Britain's 
ties to Spain through NATO and, prospectively, the European Economic Community 
plus Spain's willingness to protect the interests of Gibraltar's inhabitants
CQ
made the analogy with Argentina inappropriate. On the 10th of November, the 
Argentine Foreign Minister stated that Britain's new Gibraltar policy could 
represent a significant precedent for the future of Anglo-Argentine relations*
On the 12th of December, the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign 
Affairs released its report on the Falkland Islands* While the report was 
generally supportive of the Government's policies, the report did request a more 
concerted effort be made to normalize relations and stated that It considered 
some sort of compromise with Argentina unavoidable• The Committee agreed that 
the prospects for an early resolution of the dispute were remote, but that
•••the present solution* *can only offer an uncertain future for 
the Islands in the long-term, and that some kind of accommodation 
with Argentina is not only inevitable, in view of the ceet of the 
present policy to the United Kingdom, but also desirable if the 
Falklands are to have any prospect of long-term economic 
prosperity and political stability*”0
The Committee further suggested that: 1) as soon as Argentina declares an end to 
hostilities, the British government should lift the protection zone; 2) the 
Government should freeze its fortification of the Islands while announcing that 
any signs of renewed Argentine aggression would reverse the policy; and 3) 
simultaneous declarations offered the best prospect for progressing towards a 
normalization of relations.
On 17 December, the Argentine Foreign Minister outlined his government's 
new diplomatic strategy with respect to the Falklands dispute* The Argentines
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now plan to pursue a virtual public relations campaign to play upon the growing 
perception of Thatcher's intransigence and bring pressure upon her government to 
demonstrate more flexibility In negotiations. As well as acting through various 
International fora, the Argentines plan to direct their efforts at domestic 
opponents of Thatcher's policies. To influence British public opinion, the 
Argentine government has enrolled a publicity agency to advance Its case via the 
British newspapers* The government also established a Center for the South 
Atlantic to conduct informational seminars and coordlante cultural events to 
promote the Argentine position in the dispute.
Relations in 1985
On 1 February, 1985, Keith Best, a Conservative Member of Parliament, met 
with President Alfonsln and Senator Berhongary (President of the Senate's 
Defense Committee) In Buenos Aires. He pressed for an Argentine cessation of 
hostilities, but the demand was rejected by Berhongary. During talks, means of 
re-establishing a dialogue were discussed. One suggestion was that permanent 
consultative bodies operating under an open agenda he established. While the 
immediate effect of the talks is unknown, the Argentines seemed pleased with 
this expression of Britain's desire to resume negotiations. On the 6th of 
February, the President of Argentina's Lower House Foreign Relations Committee, 
Federico Storanl, announced the Committee's intention to create an internal 
working group to examine various means of ending the current diplomatic 
stalemate.
From the 18th to the 20th of February, 1985, British Members of Parliament 
and Members of the Argentine Congress held their third meeting at the University 
of Maryland. A representative of the Falkland Islanders also attended this 
session. Both sides agreed that the present situation was unacceptable because
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of the potential for conflict* They also agrnc?d that a normal \ zacion of 
relations could not be realized until there was an agreement to discuss all 
aspects of the Islands' future, Including sovereignty. During the conference, 
the representatives considered numerous options for the future of the Falklands. 
They called for Immediate action by both governments in 1mplementlrtg measures 
which would allow a norru1lzatI on of relations, such as declaring an end to 
host I 1f f f es or lifting the protection zone.
In February, the Argentine government released a statement which condemned 
the planned revisions In the Falkland Islands Constitution* The Argentines 
charged that the plans violated United Nations resolutions^ which called upon 
both governments to refrain from Implementing policies which unilaterally 
altered the status quo* The statement charged that plans to reform the 
constitution were yet another instance of Britain's unwillingness to reach an 
accommodation with Argentina and that Britain's actions Inhibited attempts to 
resume negotiations.
"A Larger Stalemate*1
The Anglo-Argentine conflict over the Falkland Islands, In the words of one 
former Minister of State, possesses ’certain Insoluble characteristics.”*^ The 
1982 Campaign exacerbated the dispute; over 1,000 lives were lost and millions 
of dollars in armaments were exhausted as eacti government asserted its claim to 
these bleak Antarctic rocks. No matter how pacific the intentions of each 
government are now, neither can forget or forsake the domestic sacrifices made 
on behalf of the Islands. When militancy replaces diplomacy as the vehicle for 
resolving a dispute, ’one only jumps from a smaller conflict to a larger 
stalemate at greater expense.”^* The course of Anglo-Argentine relations since 
the Campaign vividly demonstrates the accuracy of this statement.
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An Untenable Status Quo
The prospects for a comprehensive resolution of the dispute during the lite 
of the present British government (the next elections are scheduled to take 
place by Summer, 1988) are remote* Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's policies 
and rhetoric concerning the Islands have committed her to an Inflexible 
hard-line stance on the subject of negotiations* Thatcher has refused adamantly 
to discuss the Issue of sovereignty or even, as Berne demonstrated, to tolerate 
future consideration of the Issue* Such a position Is not only uncompromising, 
hut also is unrealistic* The exorbitant cost of the present policy—defending 
one Falkland Islander is a thousand timefi as expensive as defending a 
Briton^—is beginning to weigh on the minds of Members of Parliament and the 
British public at large. At the same time, both domestic and international 
opinion are recognizing the destabilising nature of the present stalemate.
Without a resolution of the dispute—or at least a normalization of relations 
between London and Buenos Aires—the Falkland Islands have little hope of 
enjoying significant political or economic development, while Britain's 
relations with Latin America and much of the developing world will continue to 
be tainted by the specter of the Falk lands dispute* With a democratic 
government sitting in Buenos Aires, the time Is propitious for the conduct of 
substantive negotiations* While it is not the British government's 
responsibility to support Argentine governments, British Interests undoubtedly 
are better served by the existence of a democratic Argentina* An/ progress made 
in resolving the dispute would help vindicate Aifonsins's commitment to a 
peaceful assertion of Argentina's claim and would accrue popular support for 
Argentina's democracy* A pragmatic assessment of British interests reveals the 
futility of present policy and the necessity of reaching an accommodation with
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Argentina.
Argentina, too, needs to end its dispute with Britain* Struggling under a 
$45 billion foreign debt and skyrocketing Inflation, Alfonsin Is anxious to 
restore trade links with Britain and to improve its ties with this international 
economic power for the purpose of rescheduling Argentina's debt* Beyond that, 
achieving progress in the dispute with Britain would be a great political boon 
to Alfonsin's government.
Despite the motivations for each government to reduce tensions, the 
fundamental divergence between Britain's and Argentina's approach to the dispute 
frustrates attempts at progress. The differences exist, firstly, in each 
country's view of the nature of the dispute and, secondly, in the goal each 
seeks to attain through the negotiating process.
Self-Determination vs. Sovereignty: The British Position
Britain considers the self-determination of the Falklands' inhabitants to 
be central to the dispute. As an Assistant Undersecretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs explained to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee, "...the whole question of the Islanders' wishes, paramountcy or 
otherwise of those wishes and their interests is so much the kernel and heart of 
the political problems regarding the Falklands• Argentina, on the other hand, 
views sovereignty—that is, territoriality—as the crux of the Anglo-Argentine 
dispute. Since the 1982 Campaign, the Thatcher government consistently has 
insisted that progress in resolving the sovereignty issue can only be achieved 
in accordance with the wishes of the Islanders. While the government has not 
gone ao far as to grant the Islanders a veto over Falklands policy, Thatcher has 
made their self-determination a sacred cause through her staunch support for the 
Islanders' wishes. The transcript of a Foreign Office Minister's testimony to
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the Foreign Affairs Committee reveals the de facto veto power the Falkland 
Islanders have over government policy: Mr* Foulkes (a Member of the Committee)
asked if the Bi ttish government "...would be willing to restart negotiations, 
Including a discussion at least of the question of sovereignty?" Mr# Onslow 
(Minister of State of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) replied: "Not without
the consent of the Islanders whose rights are li, solved#" Mr. Foulkes: "So they
have a veto?" Mr* Onslow: "They have, in effect, the right to say to the House 
of Commons what they think of any actions proposed which affect them."^ In 
subsequent testimony, another Minister, Baroness Young, further asserted that 
"•••It would be Inconceivable for it (Parliament) to take a decision on 
sovereignty over the Falkland Islands against the wishes of th*» Islanders*"^
The British government bases its allegiance to the Islanders' rights upon 
Article 73 of the United Nations Charter and Article 1 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (to which Argentina is not a signatory)# 
Article 73 of the United Nations Charter charges those governments with 
administrative responsibility for external territories to "•••recognise the 
principle that the interests of the inhabitants of the territories are 
paramount••••" In Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, signatories affirm that: "All people have the right to 
self-determination* By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural 
development*"
Self-determination As An Obstacle To Progress
While Britain's commitment to protecting the Islanders' rights is admirable 
and few would suggest that the British government should abandon the 
Falklanders, Thatcher has allowed the issue of self-determination to become an
mobstacle to the negotiating process rather than a factor in negotiations. The 
concept of self-determination is to ensure that the Interests of territorial 
inhabitants are respected by the administering power and to prevent a domestic 
population from being treated like "chattels in real estate"^ during 
consideration of the territory's political future. Self-determination does not 
imply, however, that the wishes—something quite distinct from "interests"—of 
native inhabitants must be the sole determinant of the administering power's 
policy.
The applicability of the self-determination tenet to the Falkland Islands 
case is Itself rather spacious. Whether the Islands population actually 
constitutes a distinct "people" in the context of the UN Charter is highly 
questionable.^® As noted earlier, the Islands have no indigenous inhabitants, 
but always have been populated by their administering power. The history of the 
present population extends back only as far as British rule (1833). The 
Islanders are, as of the 1983 Britain Nationality Act, British citizens, who 
happen to be living on dependent territory rather than in the United Kingdom 
proper. Yet, the 1,800 Islanders possess a greater influence on policy than any 
other sector of the British population or, for that matter, any other colonial 
population. The people of Gibraltar and Hong Kong have nothing comparable to 
the Influence the Falkland Islanders exercise regarding the political future of 
their respective territories; the Yorkshire miners have nothing tantamount to a 
de facto veto over Thatcher's national policies. The British government is 
obliged to protect the rights which the Islanders possess by virtue of their 
British citizenship. However, the government is not required to sacrifice the 
Interests of the remaining 50 million British citizens on behalf of the 1,800 
Falklanders. Unless the government pressures the Islanders, they will have no
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motivation to compromise and will opt for a continuation of the status quo, 
regardless of the cost to Britain* The Islanders must come to recognise that, 
as British citizens, they can have no greater veto on government policy than any 
other minority group in Britain.^1 Britain cannot abandon the Islanders, but 
neither can the government allow Itself to be enslaved by Islander opinion* 
Self-determination vs* Sovereignty: The Argentine Position
For the Argentines, sovereignty—as an essentially territorial concept—is 
the central point to be resolved in its dispute with Britain* In Argentina's 
opinion, the present inhabitants are merely an outgrowth of British imperallsm 
and do not represent an indigenous population: .there are no Falkland
Islanders, only colonists.••. * Consequently, the self-determination argument
advanced by Britain is viewed as inapplicable and as an attempt by Britain to 
justify continued possession of the Falklands* Argentina's goal is the 
restoration of its territorial integrity by the acquisition of sovereignty over 
the Falklands and this goal cannot be subordinated to the desires of an 
artificial And alien population.
If the Argentines are to succeed in their quest for sovereignty, however, 
they must recognize the need to accommodate the present Inhabitants* As the 
British government is committed to protecting the interests of the Islanders, 
Argentina's sole prospect for reaching an agreement with Britain is a solution 
which takes into account the welfare of the Islands' population* Indeed,
British Foreign Secretary Howe referred to Spain's respect for the wishes of 
Gibraltarians as an Important factor behind Britain's willingness to negotiate 
sovereignty.^ A similar demonstration by the Argentine government would affect 
positively Britain's inclination to admit the sovereignty issue to a negotiation 
agenda* In recent statements, the Argentines have continued to challenge the
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identity of the Islanders by charging that they are merely an extension of the 
occupying power whose presence reinforces an Illegitimate occupation* At the 
same time, official pronouncements have implied that special administrative 
arrangements could be made to ensure the Islanders' way of life and interests. 
Just as the British government must recognise that protecting the Falklanders 
interests does not preclude entering Into sovereignty discussions, so must the 
Argentines learn that their sovereignty aspirations are inextricably linked to 
the provision of guarantees for the Islands' current inhabitants.
Short-term vs. Long-term Concerns
The second-level of the negotiation impasse is the divergent approaches of 
the two governments to negotiations: Britain is concerned essentially with the
short-term, Argentina with the long-term. The British government has 
demonstrated, at least for the time being, a willingness to discuss only the 
normalization of relations with Argentina and a restoration of limited contacts 
(along the lines of the 1971 Communications Agreement) between Argentina and the 
Falklands.
Besides insisting that sovereignty is not negotiable, many in the British 
government belelve that negotiating such a decisive issue as sovereignty, for 
the time being, is doomed to failure and that the effort could be invested more 
profitably in talks on normalizing relations. In an address to the United 
Nations General Assembly, Foreign Secretary Howe explained the British 
negotiating position. He said that if talks were
...not to founder at the outset on the very issue that divides 
us, they (can) not address the question of sovereignty.••• We 
have sought ways of improving relations with Argentina by 
tackling practical issues where real progress is possible to the 
benefit of both sides..., the only way forward is to find a way 
of taking such practical steps as will enable confidence to be
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re-established between our two peoples*^
Argentina, on the other hand, considers talks which exlcude the issue of 
sovereignty to be pointless as they ceny the very essence of the dispute* Any 
Improvement in relations with the United Kingdom would be artificial because the 
Falklands would remain an ever present point of contention, casting a permanent 
shadow over Anglo-Argentine relations* In addition, the Argentine government 
fears that their participation in negotiations which exclude the question of 
sovereignty might be interpreted as an implicit abandoning of Argentina's 
sovereignty claim* Although Argentina has shown a willingness to participate in 
a dialogue designed to Improve relations with Britain, they have insisted that, 
while the discussion of sovereignty can be postponed, it cannot be explicitly 
excluded from the agenda*
Means of Achieving Short-term Progress
The failure of the Berne talks seem to demonstrate the fundamental 
liMompatablllty of Britain's and Argentina's approach to talks* Yet, 
opportunities do exist which will allow the parties to overcome the obstacles to 
negotiations* However, both sides must recognise that this is neither purely an 
issue of territorial sovereignty nor Is self-determination for the Islanders the 
sole point of contention* Instead, the two issues are inextricably linked and 
any practicable solution will have to address both problem*
If progress is to be achieved in normalising relations, the subject matter 
for talks cannot be all-inclusive* The more issues covered in a single 
negotiating session the more opportunities there are for the dialogue to 
collapse due to seemingly irreconcilable differences* An over-burdened 
negotiating agenda is often more of a hindrance than a boon to Improving
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relations#^ The Berne talks failed, in part, because, with an open agenda, each 
side Immediately raised what It considered to be the most critical issue* 
Unfortunately, the questions raised were also the most contentious and, as a 
consequence, the parties became deadlocked. By focusing solely on the major 
points of contention, both Britain and Argentina neglected the sisaller issue on 
which agreement could be reached.
The Bifurcation of Negotiations
The Anglo-Argentine dialogue should be divided into two sets of 
negotiations. The first would deal with the normallzatIon of relations; the 
second would cover the political tuture of the Falklands. At the outset, talks 
would be placed under what has been described m a "sovereignty umbrella^"**
That is, both governments would recognize that participation in talks does not 
prejudice prior claims to sovereignty# Assured both that the essence of the 
dispute is being addressed and that Argent ins"s participation in talks does not 
Involve a tacit acknowledgement of British sovereignty, Alfonsln's government 
would be free to dlsucss means of normalizing relations with Britain. Britain 
would have a forum in which to address the restoration of normal relations, 
which Britain considers a prerequisite for the conduct of more substantial 
discussions. At the same time, taking part in talks on the Islands' political 
future would allow Britain to consider the long-term prospects for the Falklands 
without necessarily debating sovereignty: preservation of the status quo is as
much an option for the future as is a transfer of sovereignty# The talks on 
normalization would very probably progress at a faster rate than the more 
contentious discussions on the future of the Islands, but this disparity will 
not prevent the dialogue from proceeding# The benefit of having bl-level talks 
is that a stalemate in one arena does not jeopardize the success of the other#
«5
In the short to medium-term, the only talks with a prospect for success are 
those on normalisation* The present government in Britain has invested too much 
money and rhetoric in the status quo to allow adequate flexibility for 
successful negotiations on the long-term future of ttu Falkland**. The most 
likely first step in negotiations would he a simultaneous declaration, wherein 
Britain would lift the protection zone and Argentina would announce a formal 
cessation of hostilities. President Alfonsin expressed his support for such an 
exchange as early as March, l' **^ The House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee advocated that Britain lift the protection zone once Argentina ended 
hostilities.^® flfice these declarations have been made, the normallzat ion of 
diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations can proceed mote smoothly. 
Confidence-Build!o£ MtajiureH
Both sides have available to them a number of confidence-building measures 
which could he undertaken both as a demonstration of good faith during the 
negotiation process and to create an atmosphere more conducive to dialogue* 
Britain has consistently expressed a willingness either to return the Argentine 
war dead or to arrange a visit by the families to the Falklands. The acceptance 
of such a humanitarian offer by Argentina could create a better climate for 
relations between the two countries* Continued low-level contact, such as has 
occurred already between Members of Parliament and Members of the Argentine 
Congress, allow the two sides to come together for talks In a more casual and 
open manner, without the pressure and rhetoric which accompany official 
meetings* Discussions between Britain and Argentina on such non-sovereignty 
Issues as fishing rights and, perhaps, joint exploration projects (e*g* for 
minerals and hydrocarbons) would demonstrate their common Interest in Improved 
relations* To advance the cause of normalized economic relations, Argentina
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t■ ou 1 HI ft 0W)ve t hr ovc facers ) who wre Installed In British
businesses at the outbreak ot hosti l it ies, 4tt 0 sign of their good faith and 
commit me nt to achieving better f^MHons* in  feroguflMii of blesldent 
Alfonsin's attempts to curb Argent Ins's military power, tfi* British should 
reduce the rate at which they are fortifying the Islands, as « good faith 
gesture* Finally suggestions have been made that a visit by the halted Nations' 
Decolonization Committee both to monitor Britain's admlnlsfcrat(on of the Islands 
and to discover the Falklanders' opinion of their own future might he helpful* 
The Mouse of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee endorsed the Mm  ul the 
Committee v is i t in g .^  S t i l l ,  this v is it  would he more for the propaganda race 
within the United Nations than i t  would he a tool for improving Anglo-Argentine 
re 1st Ions.
While the normalization talks will proceed faster than the future policy 
talks, they still must be approached with patience and caution, in a very 
piecemeal fashion—dea i Ing with one aspect of the dispute at a time. In 
Britain, opinion Is shifting in favor of reaching an accommodation with 
Argentina, and In Buenos Aires, Alfonsin is anxious to demonstrate that his 
peaceful approach to the Falklands dispute can enjoy success. A normalization 
of relations would benefit both countries and their differences can be bridged 
easily through cooperation and compromise. However, the failure to separate 
talks on normalization from the conundrum of the Islands' political future has 
obstructed progress, thus far* By initiating hi-level discussions, progress in 
one set of talkR will not be limited by the slower pace or stalemate of the 
other. At the same time, progress in the restoration of relations may give 
Impetus to the discussions on the Falklands' political future.
CHAPTKR FIVK:
Long-Tg if# Solutions to the^  CojiJHJkjt
Th^ Imperative^ of Progress^
"The Falkland Islands" misfortune has always been to be wanted more than 
they are l o v e d . T h e  durability and, at times, intensity of the 
Anglo-Argentine dispute over this dismal Antarctic acrhlpelago vividly reflects 
this characteristic of the Falkland Islands conundrum* Throughout 150 years of 
disagreement, Britain and Argentina have been unable to devise a mutually 
acceptable resolution to the problem* The seventeen years of talks which 
preceded the 1982 conflict effected little substantive progress* Since the 
conflict, however, both International and domestic pressure have been placed on 
the two governments to commence a serious dialogue so that further bloodshed can 
be averted* The ominous force which contemporary governments can unleash 
against each other has made the international community extremely sensitive of 
threats to peace: the Falklands dispute represents just such a potential
menace* Modern technology and weaponry have reduced the entire globe to a 
single battlefield, making a conflict in the South Atlantic as destabilising as 
one in the lllddle East* World opinion, then, Is anxious to see the two sides 
sit down together In an attempt to resolve their dispute peacefully and thereby 
eliminate the latent threat to regional and international stability*
As a result of the numerous post-mortems conducted on the Falklands 
Campaign, many in Britain are coming to recognize that their victory In the
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Campaign was a "damned close-run thing"* and that Britain's capacity to repeat 
the effort, if needed, is diminishing while Argentina's is Increasing* Many 
believe that, unless an accommodation is reached with Argentina during the next 
twenty to thirty years, Britain will he unable to enforce militarily its claim 
to the Islands. Time is perceived to be on Argentina's side. As one Member of 
Parliament suggested, "I do not want our forces to be engaged in such a venture 
two, five, 10 or 20 years from now, because next time we may not be so 
fortunate."'*
Argentina Is, of course, eager to begin substantial talks on the long-term 
future of the Falklands. The commencement of these talks would strike a major 
victory for Alfonsin's government and for his commitment to diplomatic means of 
resovilng the dispute. The Argentines, however, are unwilling to participate in 
tal’.*o which fail to address the essence of the dispute while dealir*; only with 
superficial questions. Argentina will not concede it claim to sovereignty, but 
the Alfonsin government is willing to he more flexible in its interpretation of 
the claim.^ Many officials share a common sentiment: "The one thing we are not
going to tolerate is another 17 fruitless years of t a l k s . S t i l l ,  Argentina 
must be careful not to misinterpret British opinion. While many Britons support 
an accommodation with Argentina, they believe that negotiations should progress 
slowly and patiently so that both Britain's and the Islanders' Interests can be 
protected. Britain's presence at the negotiating table will not Imply that the 
British are ready to surrender immediately by the pen that which Argentina 
failed to procure by the sword
The political future of the Falklands could take a number of forms, some of 
which offer a better prospect for success than do others. By analysing the 
merits and fallings of the most frequently discussed solution schemes for the
2
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Falklands, one is able to determine the limits of feasibility within which the 
Anglo-Argentine dispute must be resolved* By considering which aspects of the 
various solutions are most practical and viable, one can piece together a novel 
resolution of the dispute, tailored to the unique specifications of this 
conflict* The Falkland Islands dispute is an unorthodox problem, so any 
practicable solution will likely be unconventional as well, combining the most 
promising features of numerous proposed solutions*
IllfL StatUJL Quo
The most obvious option for resolving the dispute is actually a 
non-solution: that is, a continuation of the status quo* Britain would keep on 
fortifying the Islands and funding their development while Argentina would 
continue to protest and remonstrate against British policy. The rift in 
Anglo-Argentine relations would go unrepaired and the good relationship enjoyed 
prior to the Campaign would be forgotten*
The_ Falklanders and the Status Quo Option
The disadvantages of this policy are so numerous as to leave It virtually 
devoid of support in either Britain or Argentina* What support does exist for 
this policy emanates almost wholly from the Falkland Islanders themselves* To 
some Islanders, the present policy is reassuring* The military's presence 
deters further Argentine incursions against the Falklands while economic 
Investment demonstrates Thatcher's commitment to retaining the Islands* During 
testimony to the Foreign Affairs Committee, one member of the Falkland Islands 
Committee (Mr* Cheek)—a Falkland Islands based pressure group dedicated to 
keeping the Islands British—described the satisfaction of some Islanders with 
their new-found British security blanket:
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Mr. King: "Would your committee be quite happy with the
continuation of what has been described as Fortress Falklands 
forever and ever?"
Mr. Cheek: "Yes.•.as long as there Is any risk at all to the
Islands, yes, we want that, we want to remain British as we are 
now and be defended as we are now.. .
The British View of the Status Quo Option
However, neither Britain nor Argentina considers preserving the 
Anglo-Argentine to he a tenable long-term solution to the dispute. For Britain, 
the present policy Is expensive both In economic terms and in damage to 
Britain's international standing. As noted previously, the cost to Britain of 
restoring, developing, and garrisoning the Islands is exorbitant. With 
Britain's sagging economy and the government's strained budget, the annual 
investment In the Falklands of an amount equivalent to AO pounds per British
Q
taxpayer represents a serious drain on the limited financial resources of the 
government with little hope of over recouping its Investment. Significant 
economic development requires external Investment, hut the tenuous future of the 
Islands dissuades most would-be investors.
At the same time, prices for wool—the Islands' main product—have 
decreased and are expected to remain low for some time. The Islands also suffer 
from a shortage oi labor, partially resulting from high emigration (especially
Q
of females) rates of around 1.5% annually. Thus, the economic prospects for 
the Falklands are bleak until a resolution of the conflict permits both external 
Investment in the Islands and a normal trade relationship with South America. 
Without a practicable solution to the dispute, economic development of the 
Islands is impossible and the Falklanders' fate Is to become wholly dependent on 
an •.expenselve, complex and time-consuming life-line over 8,000 miles of
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ocean to the United Kingdom."*^
The Island garrison also represents a serious distortion of British defense 
priorities. Since the <lose of World War II, Britain's strategic orientation 
has focused on Europe and the North Atalantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The 
massive diversion of military resources and personnel to the Falklands since the 
1982 Campaign has detracted from Britain's contribution to NATO. In an alliance 
already wracked by financial squabbling^, Britain's Fortess Falklands policy 
carries with it both a price tag-NATO members can ill afford and a strong 
potential for initiating yet another Alliance debate on finances.
Officials in the Ministry of Defence insist that the Falkland Islands 
garrison does not represent a serious distortion of British defense policy.
They argue that, whether they are stationed on the Rhine or on the Falklands, 
the costs of feeding and quartering the troops is comparable. However, this 
argument ignores the excessive transportation costs—measured in both time and 
money—involved in fortifying the Falklands. What is more, troops stationed in 
the South Atlantic simply are not available for use in situations where 
Britain's interests may be more seriously challenged than they are in the South 
Atlantic (e.g. Northern Ireland, NATO exercises).
Proponents of the current policy also suggest that the Falklands provide 
invaluable training for the troops. While this may have been true during the 
actual campaign, the alleged benefits of stationing troops on the Islands 
permanently are obscure. If the Falklands provide such a ripe training ground, 
why were successive governments so anxious to deplete the Islands' garrison 
prior to April, 1982? No one propounded the training advantages of the Islands 
before the Argentine invasion. Besides, if the Island garrison represents such a 
boon to military fitness, why is the government so anxious to create a defense
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infrastructure which will decrease the demand for troops (e*g* through the 
construction of the Mount Pleasant airfield)? Rather than representing a 
genuine strategic concern, the Fortress Falklands policy is an Instance of 
"military activity expanding to fill the resource allotted to it* *
Finally, as a military policy, Fortesa Falklands la a losing proposition 
for the British. Fortifying the Islands is just one small aspect of Brlti b 
defense policy* Britain cannot afford to provide the Islands wltn Its most 
advanced military hardware and best troops: this would be too great a
distortion of policy* For Argentina, the situation is quite different* 
Argentina's entire military capability represents a threat to the Islands as 
long as the dispute goes unresolved* The Argentines do not have to transport 
their forces 8,000 miles or quarter them on a physically inhospitable Island in 
order to pose a challenge to Britain* The mere existence of armed forces in 
Argentina threatens the Islands* In order to counter this, Britain's military 
capability on the Islands must be updated continually to counter Argentina's 
growing might* As Argentina's rearmament proceeds, Britain's ability to match 
Argentina's military capability will involve an increasingly substantial 
diversion of resources from other defense concerns* Argentine rearmament has 
already replaced most of its losses from the 1982 Campaign and has Improved its 
capacity to engage in a low intensity war of attrition for the Falklands* While 
the present government Is not contemplating my such action, a long-term refusal 
by Britain to negotiate the dispute will make such an option more attractive to
future governments* Time is definitely on Argentina's side in any regionally
12contained arms race*
In addition to the high monetary costs of the policy, maintaining the 
status quo hurts Britain's international standing. While Britain's relationship
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with Argentina has not >een a prime concern of foreign policy, the damage to 
Britain's relations with Latin Ameilca is significant. Trade has suffered and 
her position vis-a-vis Guatemala in the Belize aispute has deteriorated. 
International support for Britain is waning as reflected in declining support 
for Britain's position in the United Nations. With the advent of democracy in 
Argentina, pressures for a negotiated solution have Increased and, since Berne, 
Britain has been charged with intransigence. A long-term attempt to avoid 
negotiations and support the status quo would see Britain more frequently 
condemned and scolded by other nations for its stubborn perpetuation of regional 
instability. Britain's standing with members of the Developing World would 
deteriorate since many of them consider the Falklands to be an anachronistic 
relic of Imperialism. A long-term continuation of the present policy also would 
weaken Britain's position in the upcoming (1991) renegotiation of the Antarctic 
Treaty. Many opponents of Britain's Islands' policy will be present at the 
Antarctic negotiating table and they would feel no obligation to reward British 
intransigence on the Falklands with compromise and cooperation in the Antarctic. 
Thus, maintaining the status quo incurs serious political costs which extend 
beyond the South Atlantic. In 1983, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee acknowledged the larger repercussions of the government's policy when 
it noted that H...present policy.. carries with it unfortunate implications for 
the wider conduct of foreign policy both now and for the future.
Increased pressure from Britain's closest ally—the United States—can also 
be expected. While Britain may consider its Latin American relations to be of 
secondary Importance, the same cannot be said for the United States. The Reagan 
Administration has made Latin Amerla a primary focus of its foreign policy and 
American support for Britain in the 1982 conflict seriously undermined its
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regional standing* Anxious to regain credibility, the United States has cooled 
its supprt for Britain and has advocated the resumption of negotiations* 
Domestically, a continuation of the status^ quo has marginally more 
credibility, if only because it avoids the appearance of conceding to either 
Argentine or international pressure* But as the British population becomes 
aware of the extremely high price of Portress Falklands, public support will 
diminish and domestic pressure for an accommodation with Argentina will grow* 
Members of Parliament already are becoming disenchanted with the drain on 
British finances and resources involved in the present policy* One Member of 
the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee lamented the diversion of
•••money which would keep (coal) pits open, electrify railways 
and create new roads and jobs for my unemployed constituents*
How do I explain to them that*.*we are going to provide roads, 
jobs and other facilities nearly A,000 miles away In the South 
Atlantic with their money?**
This Member Is not alone in his frustration with present governmental policy on 
the Falkland Islands* The British are coming to realise the Illogical nature of 
a policy which denies the very dispute Itself* The present government is 
exhibiting an "ostrich with his head in the sand" mentality by perpetuating the 
status quo* Refusing to negotiate the long-term future of the Islands does not 
dispose of the conflict; it merely postpones its resolution*
Islander opinion, while appreciative of recent British Investment in the 
Falklands, is quite divided on the long-term viability of current policy* A 
majority of the population is perfectly content with Fortress Falklands, viewing 
it as a guarantee of the Islands continued link with Britain* The more zealous 
Falkland Islanders oppose any accommodation with Argentina whatsoever on the
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rather naive assumption that, since they do not recognize the Argentine claim to 
the Islands, they need not acknowledge the existence of an Anglo-Argentine 
conflict at all* Said one Islander: "We do not recognise any problem and do
not recognise that there is any legal dispute or any claim with Argentina."** 
However, some Islanders are beginning to acknowledge the need to reach some sort 
of agreement with Argentina* The vast majority of the population still wishes 
to retain Its British identity, but there Is a growing awareness that the 
current policy only perpetuates a state of Instability and is Infeasible as a 
long-term solution* One Falklander told the House of Commons' Foreign Affairs 
Committee that
It is our turn to face up to the fact that we cannot remain a 
colony and cannot strengthen our ties with Britain, and we cannot 
continue to be a drag on the British people**"
The majority of the Islanders wish to see a normalization of Brltlsh/Argentlne 
relations but have no desire to reestablish Argentine/Falkland Islands links* 
They would rather live amidst a British garrison than under Argencine rule*
The Argentine View of the Status Quo Option
Maintaining the status quo as a long-term policy option would frustrate the 
Argentines as much as it would please the Falkland Islanders* In contrast with 
its effect on Britain, the status quo represents for Argentina a political, 
rather than a financial, liability* The funds dedicated to Argentina's 
post-Campaign rearmament may well have been dedicated to the enhancement of her 
military capabilities anyway as the necessary outgrowth of a nations' 
modernization drive* Argentina has suffered some from trade restrictions, but 
the dispute has not inhibited attempts to renegotiate Argentina's immense 
foreign debt* Indeed, British banks have facilitated the renegotiation of the
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Argentine debt. Britain's protection zone around the Falklands, however, has 
cost Argentina some revenue from their fishing industry* Still, opposition to 
the sftus quo policy is based primarily on political, rather than economic, 
factors*
As occurred In Britain, the 1982 Campaign brought the Falklands Issue to 
the forefront of the national consciousness* A failure by Alfonsln's government 
to achieve progress on the issue during his term could he exploited by opponents 
in the next election* Beyond this, the Falklands dispute is a very emotional, 
nationalistic subject* A tangible success for Argentina in resolving the 
dispute could unite the nation behind both its young democracy and Alfonsln's 
government* Argentina is growing impatient with British intransigence and, 
thus, the government Is under increasing pressure to begin substantial 
negotiations with Britain* Consequently, a long-term policy which continued the 
current stalemate would have serious political repercussions for Buenos Aires* 
Still, time is generally felt to be on Argentina's side since Britain is forced 
to bear the brunt of the financial and political burdens of a status quo policy* 
The general acceptance of this view in Argentina counsels patience to those 
elements In the population which are demanding a rapid resolution of the 
conflict.
The Status Quo Option Assessed
The status quo option, then, appeals only to the Falkland Islanders—and 
not even to all of them—as a long-term policy* The financial and political 
costs on both sides are burdensome* In addition, both sides seem to recognise 
that this option is really no solution at all since it leaves unresolved the 
crux of the dispute: competing Anglo-Argentine claims of sovereignty over the 
Islands* Under this policy, the disease is not cured, it merely is forced into
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remission. Britain and Argentina must find a long-term policy for the Falklands 
which will bring peace to the region. A continuation of current policy would 
lead only to a "...protracted and venomous cold war In the South 
Atlantic.•.
Variations on the Status Quo: Integration
A number of other options which have been forwarded as possible long-term 
solutions are actually just variations on the status quo policy. These Include 
Integration with the United Kingdom, free association, and associated statehood. 
Choosing one of these options as a long-term solution to the dispute would alter 
only minimally the current situation and would neither alleviate the enormous 
costs of the present policy to Britain, nor would they be acceptable to 
Argentina. The dispute would continue, only the name of the Islands-’ political 
status would alter.
Integration with the United Kingdom would make the Falklands a Dependent 
State of the British Crown similar In status to the Isle of Man or the Channel 
Islands. For Britain, such a measure would Institutionalize the enormous 
expenditures presently dedicated to the Islands. The garrison costs would 
continue because Britain would have to make the Islands as secure as the rest of 
British territory. Of course, the likelihood of an Argentine Invasion would 
diminish. Buenos Aires would be In no doubt as to Britain's commitment to the 
Islands. An Invasion of the Falklands would be tantamount to a direct assault 
on Great Britain and Britain would be at liberty to Invoke any relevant defense 
treaties in her support. In addition to military costs, Integration with the 
United Kingdom would obligate the government to provide the Falklands with the 
same social services as are available to the rest of the British population.
The Falklanders unavoidably would be given disproportionate represenatlon In
98
Parllamant* The vote of their Member of Parliament, representing just 1,800 
people, would carry the same weight as the vote of a Member representing some 
50,000 electors.***
Since this solution is in accordance with the Ideals of self-determination
and adheres to the tenets of the United Nations Charter, International pressure
on Britain would cease to come from some quarters (e.g* the Western nations)*
But to Argentina and many of its Latin American neighbors, this would be
perceived as nothing more than a neo-colonialist tactic and a gross violation of
Argentina's territorial Integrity. Rather than resolve the Anglo-Argentine
conflict, this policy would only antagonize the Argentines and perhaps even
incite them to military action, since the incorporation would preclude reaching
a satisfactory settlement through negotiations* The House of Commons Foreign
Affairs Commltte acknowledged the imperative of finding a long-term solution
which would be acceptable to both Argentina and the other countries of the
region. "In the long ran a solution acceptable to the Falklands' immediate
neighbours is essential...; neither independence noc incorporation in the United
1 qKingdom could conceivably achieve that objective.*
Intej atlon Assessed
As with the status quo, the Falkland Islanders are the greatest proponents 
of integration with the United Kingdom. Under such a policy, Britain's 
commitment to the Islands would be permanently guaranteed. The uncertainty and 
instability of their colonial status would end as the Falklands' future would no 
longer be affected by changes in Britain's ruling party. Yet, the Falklanders 
must recognize that integration with the United Kingdom will not diminish 
Argentina's dedication to possessing the Islands, but it may instigate a change 
in the method of recovering the Islands from peaceful to military means. In the
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event of another invasion, Britain's commitment to defending the Islands will 
not be in doubt, hut her capacity to successfully dislodge the Argentines a 
second time Is highly uncertain* Argentina has learned the lessons of the 1982 
conflict very well and her rearmament has Increased greatly her ability to repel 
a British counterattack* While Britain has Invested heavily in the Falklands, 
her amphibious assault viability ix»yond the NATO area has continued to 
deteriorate* Thus, incorporation with the United Kingdom suffers from the same 
disadvantages as a continuation of the status quo; that is, the policy merely 
gives a sense of satisfaction to the Islanders without addressing the heart of 
the Anglo-Argentine dispute*
Variations on the^  Status Quo; Free Association
The free association of the Falklands with the United Kingdom would involve 
the development of internal autonomy for the Islands, while Britain would retain 
responsibility for foreign and defense matters* The decision to form a free 
association would be based upon an expression of the Islanders' will, probably 
measured by a referendum. The Falklanders would retain the right to terminate 
the association later if they so desired* However, this policy assumes a large 
degree of Internal self-government exists prior to the formation of the 
association* Thus, the Falkland Islands government would have to evolve from an 
institution serving the administrative needs of a colony to an autonomous 
self-governing body for the Falklands* Whether such an expansion Is feasible 
considering the Islands' small population and the fact that those currently in 
government serve on a part-time basis (in addition to their professional 
careers) is a very serious question* In the opinion of some Islanders, 
population size already limits their ability to meet their governmental needs 
and the idea of assuming further governmental responsibilities, without a
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population expansion. Is absurd. Said one Islander,
...much will have to be done within the Islands before any form 
of self-governmentf can be democratically achieved, as a 
population of 1,800 cannot begin to contemplate this... (The) 
present system of government does not work, as there are too few 
people with the time to afford away from their employment 
attending m e e t i n g s . *
At present, due to the fall in wool prices and the inability of the Islands to 
conduct trade with their South American neighbors, the Islands lack the economic 
and human resources to support complete self-government. The current policies 
of the British government are making the Islanders even more dependent on the 
British, further increasing the length of time required for self-government to 
become a feasible proposition.
Free Association Assessed
Beyond the difficulties of preparing the Falklands for free association, 
the policy would perpetuate many of the disadvantages of the current stalemate. 
Further, free association would not offer an acceptable resolution of the 
dispute since it represents a unilateral move by Britain and Ignores the 
Argentine role in the conflict. Free association would not eliminate the 
financial burden placed on Britain since the British government would still be 
responsible for the Islands' defense. The problem of matching Argentina's 
military expansion and the Increased likelihood of Argentina resorting to 
military action—since free association would also preclude a negotiated 
settlement with Britain—would perpetuate costs already present In current 
Falklands policy. What Is more. Parliament would also have to finance the 
Islands' budget, further Increasing the costs of this policy option.
Through free association, the Falklanders would be guaranteed equal
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representation In the British Parliament, which would encounter the same problem 
of disproportionate representation a s  would happen with the integration option. 
Also similar to integration with the United Kingdom, free association would 
enjoy the support of much of the international community since the ideal of 
self-determination would be fulfilled. The support of Latin American nation* 
again would he withheld.
The Idea of free association appeals to Falkland Islanders because it 
permanently guarantees their ties to Britain and would demonstrate to Argentina 
Britain's commitment to their defense. Argentina, of course, denounces free 
association with Britain for the Falklands since It would Ignore their claim to 
the Islands. The prospect of the Islands forming a free association with 
Argentina is incomprehensible since a free association can only be entered into 
upon the freely expressed will of the inhabitants of the territory. The 
Falklanders have never demonstrated even an inkling of a desire to bind 
themselves to Argentina. Indeed, their opposition to Argentine rule is at the 
heart of the Anglo-Argentine dispute.
Variations on the Status Quo? Associated Statehood
Associated statehood Is a concept similar to free association, in that the 
Falklands would exercise self-rule while Britain would provide for their defense 
and foreign affairs. Associated statehood, however, allows for a modified 
degree of self-government and does not require that the territory be 
economically viable.^ These less stringent qualifications seem more relevant 
to the characteristics of the Falkland Islands' situation. However, associated 
statehood generally represents a temporary stage for territories progressing to 
full independence, which is neither a feasible nor a greatly desired goal of the 
Islanders. What is more, associated statehood is a unilateral move in the
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dispute and, thus, fails to resolve the difficulties Inherent in the previous 
three policy options. Britain's burdensome expenditures would continue, 
Argentina's desire to repossess the Islands would not abate, and the solution 
would lack regional support. In fact, many countries consider associated 
statehood to be nothing more than veiled colonialism, so broad international 
support—at least In the developing world—would be lacking.
Integration with the United Kingdom, free association, associated 
statehood, and a continuation of the status quo all represent impracticable 
long-term policies since, as unilateral actions, they do not address Argentine 
desires or concerns. The Falklands dispute is a bilateral conflict, so the only 
feasible resolutions to the problem are those which address the goals and 
interests of both governments. Any other solution could deal, at best, only 
with peripheral aspects of the dispute and would ignore the heart of the 
controversy. Bilateral conflicts require bipartisan solutions.
Independence
Independence for the Falkland Islands, while always a theoretical 
possibility, represents an impractical policy option for the future. The 
Islands simply lack the resources to support an independent state. The Islands 
have little prospect of ever being economically viable as an independent nation. 
Until the 1980s, the Islands did generate sufficient revenue internally to be 
self-supporting. However, as a colony, their revenue did not have to cover the 
expenses of operating an autonomous government, defending themselves, or 
providing social services for the population. With the fall in wool prices on 
the international market, the Islands cannot even generate enough revenue to 
meet the reconstruction costs from the Campaign, J let alone support themselves 
as an independent nation. The Islands require a substantial development effort
before they will have any prospect of becoming economically viable* The 
investment needed for such a program* however, Is lacking* The political 
uncertainty engendered by the Anglo-Argentine dispute makes the Islands too 
serious a risk to attract the investors and capital needed for their 
development* Further, unless some sort of mineral discovery is made in the 
Falklands' territorial waters, the Islands have no inherent economic value upon 
which to develop an economy#
The Falklands also lack the human resources needed to support an autonomous 
nation* While the number of small nations with diminutive populations has grown 
rapidly since the end of World War II, the Falklands would be, by far, the least 
populous independent nation in the world.^ The problems faced by these 
micro-states are enormous and the challenges to their independence frequent 
(e.g* Grenada, Vanuatu).^ The Falklands would be under a direct threat of 
invasion from Argentine and would have no hope of independently securing 
themselves against this threat: the Argentine armed forces are nearly one
hundred times the sice of the entire Falklands' population*^
Proponents of independence suggest that it could only occur after a great 
deal of economic development has taken place and the population has expanded 
through immigration* Yet, the prospects for increasing immigration sufficiently 
to make independence a viable option are minimal* The Islands are physically 
inhospitable, with their rough terrain, abhorrent weather, and total isolation 
from other nations* Further, the instability and uncertainty of che Islands' 
future makes the Islands an even more unattractive destination for would-be 
immigrants* Finally, relocating to the Islands themselves would Involve great 
expense with little hope of recovering that loss in the Falklands* The 
irrationality of expecting a significant population expansion—and of basing a
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policy on an expected expansion—was noted by one Incredulous Member of 
Parliament:
Do you really think people will make the sort of commitment we 
have been talking about—125,000 to establish a farm for their 
children—with that political uncertainty...?2'
Independence would not prove a cost effective policy option for Britain 
until the very distant future. Vast expenditure to creat an economic 
Infrastructure would be a prerequisite for granting Independence. Both before 
and after Independence, Britain would still be obligated to provide most of the 
Islands' defense, as she Is doing already In Rellse. Without external support 
in defense, the Falklands' Independence very likely would be short-lived. 
Independence With an Agency Agreement
The Falklands' independence could be modified to include an agency 
agreement, whereby Britain would be designated the Falklands' agent In defense 
matters. Britain, then, would be obligated permanently to provide for the 
Islands' defense. At the same time, the British government would find Itself in 
the embarrassing position of having a tiny, distant nation dictate part of 
Britain's defense policy.^®
Independence With a Treaty of Guarantee
Another option would be formulating a treaty of guarantee for the defense 
of the Falklands prior to the grant of Independence. Britain Is, of course, the 
most obvious candidate for the position as guarantor, although its record In 
Cyprus Is not encouraging. The United Nations has also been suggested as a 
potential guarantor; however, past failures In peacekeeping (e.g. Lebanon) and 
118 lack of effective sanctions reflect doubt on Its ability to fulfill such a 
duty. The United Nations option does enjoy strong support from Argentina but
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not from Britain. The creation of a Falklands/Malvlnas Commission under the 
auspices of the United Nations Security Council to monitor a guarantee and to 
resolve disputes concerning the guarantee has also been proposed. Prospective 
members are Britain, Argentina, the United States, the Organization or American 
States (OAS), and other interested United Nations' members. ^  What Is more, 
since developing nations—generally supporters of Argentina's position In the 
dispute—hold a vast majority In the United Nations, mobilizing support for 
action against an Argentine threat would be difficult. Mention has been made of 
the Organization of American States serving as guarantor, but neither Britain 
(who sees the OAS as hostile to British interests) nor Argentina (who suspects 
that the United States would act as Britain's proxy) seems particularly enthused 
by the suggestion. Finally, the Commonwealth's regional members (Bahamas, 
Canada, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago) and Britain could serve as 
guarantors, as they already serve essentially this purpose with regard to 
Belize. However, little Interest has been displayed by the relevant governments 
in this idea.
Independence Assessed
The Islanders are cognizant of the risks involved In Independence and, 
accordingly, offer little support for this option. Argentina and many of its 
neighbors would refuse to recognize the Islands as an Independent nation, 
thereby adding Isolation to the difficulties which would be faced by the new 
nation. As with previous policy options, neither Argentina's desire to reclaim 
the Islands nor the consequent threat posed the Islands by Argentina would 
diminish. Because the Falklands lack the resources to support an Independent 
country, especially In the face of an Argentine threat, the House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Committee rejected independence as a viable long-term solution
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to the Anglo~Argenttne dispute.^*
The Islands as a Military Base
An extension of the current Fortress Falklands policy would be the complete 
transformation of the Islands from a colony into a military base, along the 
lines of Gibraltar* Some discussion has centered on transforming the Falklands 
into a NATO base* The Islands do possess some Inherent strategic value by 
virtue of their location both along the South Atlantic trade route and at the 
mouth of the Antarctic* In the event the Panama Canal were closed, the 
Falklands would represent a strategic base for guarding the South Atlantic 
traffic lanes* In addition, the 1982 conflict demonstrated the critical 
contribution strategically located island airfields (such as Ascension) can make 
to the success of a campaign* The existence of a base on the Falklands would 
Increase aerial reconnaissance capabilities In the region, as well* The 
Falklands could become NATO's South Atlantic "unsinkable aircraft carrier*
Proponents of this plan exaggerate the contribution the Islands would make 
in the event of a conflict involving NATO* While control of the sea lanes is 
essential for reinforcement, the South Atlantic is not expected to be a major 
route for reinforcements* Most ships will be sent from Atlantic ports in the 
United States* Those items coming from the western United States could be 
transported faster and more securely by rail across the United States to the 
Atlantic ports than they could going around South America* Finally, a hostile 
Argentina could wreak havoc on Allied shipping as It passed through the South 
Atlantic* According to one Member of Parliament, there is "...little likelihood 
that the South Atlantic would play a large role in any NATO conflict*"^
The Latin American nations—especially Argentina—would greet the 
establishment of a regional NATO base with Intense hostility and condemnation*
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Argentina's anger would stem from the loss of the Falklands, since the creation 
of the base both would end any prospects for a negotiated return of the Islands 
and would preclude any military action aimed at recovering the Falklands* 
Argentina ardently desires the return of the Falklands, but she is not about to 
challenge the combined forces of NATO for the sake of a few desolate Islands*
All of Latin America would be Incensed by the militarisation of the region and 
the expansion of East-West competition to the edge of the Antarctic* The Latin 
Americans would further fear that the militarisation could eventually Introduce 
nuclear weapons into the region, which could constitute a violation of the 1967 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco 
Treaty)* Some Latin Americans fear that, once nuclear weapons are Introduced 
into the region, little can be done to deter Argentina (who did not sign the 
Tlatelolco Treaty) and Brasil from developing atomic weapons*^
Transforming the Falklands into a military base is an expensive 
proposition, and whether the other NATO members actually desire a South Atlantic 
base, let alone are willing to fund its development, Is unknown* To adequately 
fortify the Falklands, a deep water port, dock facilities, fuel and ammunition 
depots, an early warning system, and enlarged airfield all need to be 
constructed.^*
While the transformation of the Islands into a NATO base would offer the 
Islanders their greatest security against an Argentine invasion, the Islanders 
seem less than enthusiastic about this proposal* The ostensible purpose of the 
1982 Campaign was, in Prime Minister Thatcher's words, to guarantee the 
Islanders' way of life* Yet, the complete militarization of the Islands would 
destroy their earlier lifestyle* The population would be swamped by military 
personnel (there are already more than two British soldiers for each Island
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inhabitant) and the economy would inevitably come to depend on the garrison for 
the Islands' economic livelihood* The Islanders would prefer a return to the 
status quo ante helium rather than witness their Islands' conversion into a 
military base.
A South Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Another mill, ary option for the Falklands that has been contemplated is the 
formation of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization which would guarantee the 
security of the entire region, including the Falkland Islands. The arrangement 
probably would be less formal than NATO. Prospective members include the United 
States, United Kingdom, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and South Africa.
Such an organization would protect the South Atlantic trade routes in times of 
international and regional tension and, during peace, could maintain the 
stability of the region through which passes nearly 70% of all goods destined 
for North America and Western Europe.^ The concept of a South Atlantic Treaty 
Organization is not new; original discussion of the idea dates back to 1966.
The events of 1982, however, revived interest la the organization.
The obstacles to the effective implementation of this proposal are 
enormous. For the idea to succeed, both Britain and Argentina would have to be 
members. Yet, both governments reject outright their mutual involvement in a 
defense pact.^ The Falkland Islanders, too, are opposed to the participation 
of Argentina in any regional security organization. None of the other potential 
members have demonstrated much interest in the proposal.
South Africa's system of apartheid has made it an international pariah and 
many nations (e.g. the United States and the United Kingdom) would invite 
domestic and international criticism by aligning themselves with her, although 
South Africa's participation in any South Atlantic security pact is considered
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Indispensable. While participation In such a scheme partially could relieve 
Britain of Its defense burden on the Falklands, the British government Is less 
than enthusiastic about obligating itself militarily beyond the NATO area. To 
do so would contradict Britain's post-World War II Eurocentric defense strategy. 
Thus, even bringing the relevant nations together to form a South Atlantic 
Treaty Organization appears to be an insurmountable obstacle. As one expert 
noted, "It is evident that the interests and perceptions of the countries 
Involved are so divergent that it is hard to envisage any kind of closer or more 
tlghtly-knlt s stem."3^
The formation of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization, In the long run, 
could destabilize, rather than secure, the region. The introduction of a 
defense organization could undermine adherence to the Antarctic Treaty which, 
since 1959, has governed the region based on the principles of international law 
and governmental cooperation. At the same time, the formation of the treaty 
organization could lead to the militarization of the region by prompting an 
increased Soviet and East European presence in the South Atlantic. The 
expansion of East-West competition into the South Atlantic could Increase, 
rather than reduce, tensions In the region (the Indian Ocean offers a relevant 
analogy) and, in the opinion of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 
could .possibly bring about the very conflict that it would be designed to 
prevent."^® The formation of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization does not 
represent a practicable or reliable means of ensuring the long-term security of 
the Falkland Islands.
Tripartita Government
On a smaller level, the creation of a tripartite agreement between Britain, 
Chile, and Argentina covering rival claims to the Beagle Islands, the Falklands
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and Dependencies, and Antarctic territory has been proposed. This agreement 
would Involve the suspension of sovereignty claims In favor of joint 
administration and cooperation in the region's economic development. Argentina, 
however, considers that such an arrangement for regional cooperation could only 
be made after Its respective disputes with Britain and Chile have been resolved 
bilaterally.^ Furthermore, relations between Argentina and Chile historically 
have been bitter. The likelihood of such an extensive cooperative effort 
succeeding is small, especially as long as Chile is ruled by Pinochet's military 
dictatorship. Britain would oppose Argentine attempts to link the Dependencies 
with the Falkiands dispute, since the validity of Argentina's claim is 
distinctly different (weaker) for the Dependencies than it is for the Falkland 
Islands.
The formulation of a separate treaty dealing with the three countries' 
claims to Antarctic territory while the Antarctic Treaty is still in effect 
(Britain, Argentina, and Chile are all signatories) undoubtedly would be 
resented by the ether signatories to the Antarctic Treaty. If the three waited 
until after the 1991 review of the Treaty to enact their agreement, 
international cooperation in the region would end as individual nations competed 
with the tripartite club for rights to Antarctic territory. Thus, the formation 
of a tripartite agreement would not bode well for continued international 
cooperation in the Antarctic region.
Finally, tripartite government has been rejected explicitly by the Falkland 
Islanders. The Islanders oppose any arrangement which would subject them to 
Argentine administration and, even more so, they wholly oppose the idea of both 
Chile and Argentina exercising some measure of administration over the Islands. 
These sentiments were expressed to the British government in 1983 through a note
Ill
submitted to the Houee of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee* Insisted the note: 
‘Tri-partite Government not acceptable."^
Incorporation in the Antarctic Treaty
Extending the Antarctic Treaty to cover the Falklands and Dependencies is 
an oft discussed long-term policy option for the Islands. Under the Treaty, 
both Britain's and Argentina's sovereignty claims would be suspended, while the 
British would continue to exercise administrative responsibility* The Islands 
would be demilitarized and all signatory nations would cooperate in scientific 
exploration and economic development of the Islands.^ For the Treaty to be 
extended, the unanimous approval of all the consultative countries must be given 
and this would undoubtedly be a long process. Another option would be to 
postpone incorporation of the Falklands and Dependencies until the review of the 
Treaty takes place in 1991.
While this proposal represents a practicable solution to the 
Anglo-Argentine dispute over the Dependencies, the character of the Falkland 
Islands conflict renders an extension of the Antarctic Treaty an infeasible 
long-term solution. The territories presently under the jurisdiction of the 
Treaty have no permanent inhabitants (like the Dependencies) and the structure 
of the Treaty is not designed to meet the needs of administering a population 
(the most fundamental exercise of sovereignty). Furthermore, the other 
signatories to the Treaty might not wish to risk the continued successful 
operation of this rare instance of international cooperation by introducing so 
controversial a territory into the Treaty.
The Antarctic Option Assessed
Argentina opposes the idea of the Antarctic Treaty incorporating the 
Falklands because she would have to freeze her sovereignty claim while Britain
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would continue to exercise adminlstratlve rights—an unappealing notion for a 
country which already has waited 152 years to reassert sovereignty* Britain 
rejects this solution as well, since It would have to demilitarize the Islands, 
thus leaving them vulnerable to a second Argentine invasion.^ Further, the 
unrestricted access of Argentine scientific personnel to the Falklands could 
lead to an effective occupation force prior to a military attack by Argentina, 
reminiscent of President Peron's 1960s vow to reoccupy the Islands, one at a 
time, through scientific expeditions*
Because the Dependencies are neither populated nor militarized, extending 
the Antarctic Treaty to cover just these Islands Is a feasible solution to this 
part of the Anglo-Argentine dispute* Argentina's claim to the Dependencies Is 
significantly weaker than Its claim to the Falklands, so compromise Is more 
likely* The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee considered that this is 
a proposition worthy of further consideration.^ However, Argentina would only 
be willing to consider this option after British concessions were made on the 
central issue of sovereignty over the Falklands*
The International Court of Justice
In testimony before the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Eric 
Deakins, a Member of Parliament, described as '’astonishing*' the fact that 
neither Britain nor Argentina have used such International machinery for the 
resolution of disputes as the International Court of Justice.^ Yet, the lack 
of effective sanctions of this body and both Britain's and Argentina's 
uncertainty as to their claims' validity cast doubt on the utility of seeking an 
International Court ruling* In 1947, Britain suggested that the dispute over 
just the Dependencies (where Britain's claim Is much stronger than Argentina's) 
be submitted to the Court, but the Argentines refused* In 1955, Britain applied
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unilaterally to the International Court for a judgment on the Dependencies'" 
claim but, since neither government was subject to compulsory jurisdiction, the 
request was denied
If the question were submitted and the Court were to find in favor of 
Argentina, Britain would comply by offering to relocate any Islanders who wished 
to leave. However, if the Court found for Britain, Argentina very probably 
would reject the decision, as it did with a previous unfavorable verdict on its 
Beagle Channel dispute with Chile. Of course, international support for 
Argentina's claim would decline as a result, but Argentina's dedication to 
recovering the Islands is indifferent to the disapprobation of other nations. 
Still, neither Britain nor Argentina has shown any willingness to submit the 
issue of sovereignty over the Falklands to the International Court of Justice. 
During a press conference in September, 1984, President Alfonsln specifically 
stated that "...no type of arbitration is appropriate,"^ In October, the House 
of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee similarly rejected the idea of arbitration 
on the grounds that this is ".. essentially, a political rather tnan a legal 
dispute.
Mediation
Attempts to Introduce mediators into negotiations generally have been 
supported by Argentina but rejected by Britain. Still, both sides agree that 
substantive negotiations need to be bilateral the mediator would assist in 
bringing the two sides together »nd would only participate In the early stages 
of negotiations.
Numerous candidates for the mediator role exist. At times, the Italian and 
Portuguese governments have been the subject of mediation r u m o r s T h e  
Secretary-General of the United Nations, Senor Peres de Cuellar is favored by
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the Argentines. ^  Britain specifically rejects the idea of United Nations 
mediation, but, according to one expert, this does not preclude using the 
''.••good offices of the Secretary-General in a very quiet and unobtrusive 
fashion*"^0 The United States also has been suggested as a possible mediator 
due to its regional leadership role* Yet, American support for Britain in the 
Falklands Campaign makes Argentine opposition to American mediation a virtual 
certainty* The Organization of American States, serving as a single body, also 
has been suggested as a mediator* Britain, however, would oppose the 
appointment due to the OAS's support for Argentina during the 1982 Campaign.^ 
The Commonwealth and the European Economic Community have also been proposed, 
but neither organization has expressed an Interest in assuming the role and both 
would be seen as too pro-British for Argentina to accept them* Finally, 
mediation by the Non-Aligned Movement has been proposed, but this would be 
rejected by Britain since the Movement views Britain's presence in the Falklands 
as an illegitimate relic of nineteenth century colonialism* Thus, even though 
the role of a mediator would be limited, finding a candidate acceptable to both
CO
Britain and Argentina is an extremely difficult task*
Further, there is concern that the involvement of a mediator may 
complicate, rather than facilitate, negotiations* Noted a former British 
Ambassador to the United Nations, "•••intermediaries ultimately tend to develop 
a momentum of their own and become part of the problem, rather than simply 'post 
office*'."53 
The Trusteeship Option
An oft suggested but never seriously considered option is placing the 
Falklands under United Nations Trusteeship, as provided for in Chapter Twelve of 
the United Nations Charter* No precedent exists for the voluntary placing of a
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dependent territory under United Nations trusteeship, although the Charter 
provides for it in Articles 87 and 88* Submission to the United Nations, 
however, would require the consent of both Britain and Argentina, and Argentine 
approval Is unlikely unless the Trusteeship were only for an Interim period 
prior to Argentina acquiring sovereignty.
A British Administered Trust
Without a promise of sovereignty transfer for Argentina, the organization 
of the trusteeship theoretically could assume six different forms. The first 
option would be to have Britain administer the trust. However, Initial 
Argentine agreement to place the Islands under trusteeship would not be 
forthcoming If Britain were to be granted administrative rights. Such a 
concession would be tantamount to abandoning Argentina's sovereignty claim. 
Furthermore, this arrangement would have to be approved by the United Nations 
General Assembly and that likely would be denied under this scheme since British 
administration would he viewed as a perpetuation of colonialism. Britain, on 
the other hand, would certainly not accept Argentine administration of the trust 
since this would conflict blatantly with the rights of the Islanders to 
self-determination.
A Jointly Administered Trust
The second option is joint Britlsh/Argentine administration of the trust. 
However, the Islanders would vehmently oppose any Argentine participation In 
their administration. Argentina, in turn, would not tolerate being excluded 
from administration unless perhaps Britain were similarly excluded. Further, 
the bitterness in Anglo-Argentine relations over the Falklands makes It 
difficult to Imagine the two cooperating on the administration of the Islands.
An Administrative Council
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A third design for the trust's administration would be the creation of a 
council, with Britain, Argentina, and a limited number of other Interested 
nations as members, which would oversee the trust. The difficulty of finding 
third-party countries which are acceptable to Britain and Argentina was 
displayed vividly by the search earlier for a satisfactory mediator for the 
dispute. If formed, this council would supervise the operation of the current 
Falkland Islands governmental system. Despite the obstacles to its successful 
Implementation, those Members of Parliament who visited Argentina in June, 1984, 
recommended that this possibility be seriously pursued.
United Nations Administration
Along with submitting the Islands to a United Nations trust, Britain and 
Argentina could also surrender administrative rights to the United Nations, as 
stipulated in Article 81 of the United Nations Charter. However, the United 
Nations' past experience with administering a trust territory (West Irian) set a 
disastrous precendent for this proposition. Since the United Nations is 
dominated by supporters for Argentina's position, British and Islander support 
for this option is likely to be withheld.
A Strategic Trust
United Nations supervision of the trust could take a second form which 
would diminish the level of anti-British sentiment influencing administration of 
the Falklands. Under Articles 82 and 83 of the United Nations Charter, the 
Falklands could be designated a strategic area (by virtue of its location at the 
door of Antarctica and along the South Atlantic trade routes), whereby the 
Security Council would assume responsibility for the Islands' administration. 
Since Britain holds a permanent seat on the Security Council and, thus, enjoys a 
veto right, administrative decisions which curtailed the Islanders' right to
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self-determination or threatened British interests could be rejected. Argentina 
undoubtedly would oppose this scheme as patently discriminatory towards 
Argentine rights and interests, since Argentina is only an occasional member of 
the Security Council and has no power to veto policies adverse to Argentine 
interests.
An Associated Trusteeship
The final option for the trust's administration is, in essence, making the 
Falklands an associated state with the United Nations. The Islands would enjoy 
Internal self-government while the United Nations would be responsible for 
foreign and defense policy. However, the historical inability of the United 
Nations to defend territory or respond effectively to incursions against its 
forces would leave the Islands vulnerable to an Argentine attack. Furthermore, 
the difficulties for so small a population to support an autonomous governmental 
system are enormous, as noted previously. These problems would multiply since 
any change In the Falklands' political status which weakened or eliminated 
British control would lead to the emigration of many Islanders.^ In addition, 
antl-Brltlsh sentiment in the United Nations potentially could pervade foreign 
and defense decision-making for the Islands.
Placing the Falklands under a United Nations trusteeship, regardless of the 
administrative design, does not provide a feasible long-term policy for the 
Falklands. This option, like the other proposals for Internationalizing the 
dispute, merely embroils more nations in the conflict and complicates the very 
Issues at question. The only realistic long-term options for the Islands are 
those that directly address the issues of sovereignty and self-determination.
The various status quo options fall because, as unilateral moves, they neglect
the two-sided nature of the conflict and also they Ignore the contested
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sovereignty claims at the heart of the Anglo-Argentlne dispute* Similarly, the 
different means of internationalizing the conflict variously Ignore both 
sovereignty and self-determination claims. Direct compromise on the sovereignty 
and self-determination issues—flexibility on one side for concessions on the 
other—represents the only means of truly resolving the Falklands dispute. 
Abandonment
The simplest such solution is also the least palatable to Britain and the 
Islanders—that Is, that the United Kingdom just abandon the Islands* While the 
Idea does have a few supporters in Britain, such action would be political 
suicide for the government that initiated it* To abandon the Islands would make 
a waste of the lives lost in the recent Campaign. The enormous human and 
financial resources which have been dedicated recently to the Falklands makes it 
virtually Impossible for any government to turn its back on the Islands* Many 
in Britain already complain about the exorbitant cost of current policy on the 
Falklands, but for a government suddenly to declare that this Investment was all 
for naught would incite domestic outrage and could have fatal political 
repercussions* Beyond that, International opinion would condemn loudly so 
flagrant a violation of the Islanders' rights to self-determination* Any 
government disposed to surrendering the Islands could enter more profitably into 
negotiations which at least would protect the rights of the Islanders* Clearly, 
the current government feels no inclination to leave the Islands—otherwise 
there would be no stalemate now in talks with Argentina*
Shared Sovereignty? Condominium
A less drastic option which frequently has been suggested is for Britain 
and Argentina to share sovereignty over the Falklands* Under joint sovereignty, 
administration of the Islands c<*uld assume three different forms: condominium,
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consensus needed for a successful condominium are, at least for the time being, 
absent In the Falklands dispute.
Alternating Soverelgnty
The second scheme for Implementing shared sovereignty would oe to have 
sovereignty alternate between Britain and Argentina over specified time periods. 
Considering the vastly divergent approach each government has to the Islands and 
the Islanders', such a format could subject the Falklands to "see-saw** 
administration. As each nation resumed control, they would revoke the policies 
of the other and initiate new programs. On issues such as Immigration, defense, 
and economic development, the differences would be profound between the two 
governments and, consequently, the programs would have abbreviated lives.
During periods of Argentine rule, the intensity of Islander opposition to 
Argentine administration could obstruct effective government. Thus, alternating 
sovereignty could perpetuate instability in the region rather than eliminate It. 
The Andorra Solution
The third form which joint sovereignty could take one is where Britain and 
Argentina, essentially, would form a condominium to deal with the Islands' 
defense and foreign affairs, while the Falklands would enjoy self-government on 
domestic issues. A contemporary example of this is French and Spanish joint 
sovereignty over Andorra. Yet, foreign and defense policy are two areas where 
British and Argentine cooperation would prove most difficult to achieve, due to 
their distinctly different national interests and strategic concerns. 
Furthermore, as noted previously, the Falklands lack the human and financial 
resources to support a fully autonomous domestic government, especially since 
any abridgement of British sovereignty undoubtedly will spur a wave of Islander 
emigration. In spite of the apparent Inapplicability of an Andorra-style
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solution for the Falkland;*, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee still 
considers this to be an .approach which merits further study*"*^
The problem with applying joint sovereignty solutions to the Falklands 
conflict is that, to surtt-fd, they require that a cooperative relationship exist 
between the involved government • and a common perspective he held on the 
territory's significance for national interests* A domestic population on the 
territory which is unbiased in its regard for the administering powers is also 
needed. None of these criteria is present in the Anglo-Argentine dispute now 
nor are they likely to emerge In the near future*
Sovereignty Transfer with^ Guarantee
A much ore promising long-term policy for the Islands is the idea of 
transferring sovereignty to Argentina, but with guarantees made for the 
maintenance of the Islanders, British lifestyle* The government of the Aaland 
Islands represents a contemporary instance of this policy, where Finland enjoys 
titular sovereignty while the inhabitants are able to preserve their distinctly 
Swedish lifestyle.**0 Under this scheme, the Falkland Islands would be 
ess at tally autonomous in the administration of the Islands, although / gentina 
would control foreign and defense affairs*
Under this plan, the same difficulties in vesting a tiny population with 
the costs and demands of full self-government, as appeared previously under 
other options, would pertain. The small population on the Islands requires that 
the sovereign country supply funding and personnel for the enormous service and 
developmental functions demanded of a government. The present Falklands 
government would be vested with the task of governing the Islands* The Council 
would legislate on property acquisition (thereby controlling large scale 
Argentine immigration which would threaten the Islanders" special 3tatus),
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education, administrative matters, taxation and electoral law, labor law, water 
rights, land law, business activities, public health and public order standard?!, 
social services, road construction, and urban/rural development* The Islanders 
would enjoy a regional citizenship of the Falkland Islands—those who already 
enjoy British citizenship at the time the policy came into effect would have 
dual citizenship but would bo subject to Argentine administration on national 
questions* The official language of the Islands would remain English and any 
resident Argentine officials would have to speak English. Any change in the 
Islands' status would have to be approved by the Islands' Council* The 
Islanders would participate as a separate constituency in Argentine elections* 
Buenos Aires would retain jurisdiction over Islands' issues which Impinged on 
national policy and for the administration of justice. Thus, Argentina would 
achieve its goal of sovereignty while the British identity of the Islands' 
population would he preserved*
The option of a transfer of sovereignty with guarantees for the Islanders 
has a strong chance of gaining support from Argentina. Much of the force behind 
the Argentine claim is emotional: British cresence on what is considered
Argentine territory is a national embarrassment* The Argentine objective is to 
have the British removed and to have the international community recognize 
Argentina as sovereign over the Falkland Islands. The desire is not to conquer 
a people or exploit the resources of the land. Tha Aaland plan would satisfy 
Argentina's desire to have its sovereignty claim respected: the Argentine flag
would fly over the Falklands.^*
The British and the Islanders are less enthusiastic about this option*
They fear that, once sovereignty is transferred, Argentina would renege on its 
guarantees to the Islanders. The Argentines have offered to amend their
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constitution to include specific provisions for the Islanders' way of life, but 
the Islanders and Britons are quick to point out that Argentina's constitutional 
guarantees frequently have been denied Argentine citizens by their own 
governments.*^ Another possibility is to have Argentine compliance ensured by a 
treaty of guarantee. While this could guarantee the Islanders' way of life 
throughout Argentine political changes, the difficulty of finding governments to 
provide the guarantee, which are acceptable to bosh Britain and Argentina, has 
been noted previously,
A main draw back of the Aaland solution is that it entails an Immediate 
transfer of both sovereignty and administrative rights. Many officials, both in 
Britain and Argentina, consider the idea of guarantees for the Islanders' 
lifestyle linked with a sovereignty transfer to have great potential. However, 
the scheme would work better if linked with a delayed transfer of sovereignty 
Implemented through a leaseback arrangment.
Leaseback
Leaseback represents the most attractive and viable option for the 
Falklands' long-term future. However, the leaseback arrangement would have to 
be qualified by a buy-out option foe the Islands' inhabitants who adamantly 
refuse to live under Argentine rule. Under leaseback, sovereignty technically 
would be transferred to Argentina, while responsibility for administering the 
Islands would continue to reside with Britain for a designated length of time 
(the lease). Before expiration of the lease, guarantees would be Inserted in 
the Argentine constitution, similar to those embodied in the Aaland option, for 
the preservation of the Islanders' British lifestyle. Their current legal, 
political, fiscal, and cultural institutions would be retained and the Islands 
would constitute an autonomous zone in Argentina, While those now holding
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British nationality could retain their citizenship, those horn or those who 
moved to the Islands after British administration ended would hold concurrently 
Argentine national and Falkland Islands regional citizenship. Both the British 
and Argentine flags would fly during the lease.
Any time prior to the transfer of sovereignty or during the period of 
British administration, inhabitants of the Islands who wished to leave should be 
duly compensated by the British government. Noted one Islander, flf you ask us 
to talk (with the Argentines) then I think you have to say to us, 'If you do not 
want anything to do with them (the Argentines) then you can have compensation 
and resettlement• An Argentine agreement to help finance the relocation of 
Islanders could be negotiated during talks on leaseback.
Again, the problem of guaranteeing that Argentina fulfills her obligations 
to the Islanders arises. The main concern in Britain and on the Islands is not 
that a democratically elected government in Buenos Aires would renege on the 
deal, but that the military might return to power with all Its disdain for civil 
rights and constitutional guarantees. The agreement on leaseback could 
stipulate that, in the event of a return to military government or to any 
government abusive of civil rights during the period of the lease, the agreement 
could be terminated unilaterally by the British. The responsibility of 
determining if a military or abusive government sits in Buenos Aires could be 
given to the United Nations (e.g. the Secretary-General's Office) or to an 
affiliated organization (e.g. Amnesty International, which has consulatlve 
status with the United Nations or the International Peace Academy, which trains 
United Nations peacekeeping forces). Annual visits to the Islands could be made 
by the same organization to ensure that the Islanders' rights are being 
respected. Britain would be allowed to retain a reduced defense force on the
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Islandr throughout the lease period* During the early years of Argentine rule, 
an Anglo-Argentine-Islander committee could be established to clarify the 
technical application of the guarantees to the Islanders* The time period for 
compensated emigration from the Islands (only for those who Inhabited the 
Islands prior to the creation of the leaseback agreement) could be extended to 
include the first few years of Argentine rule*
The most contentious Issue in leaseback negotiations is the period of the 
lease* The British want an extended (e*g* 100 year) lease, similar to the Hong 
Kong arrangement* Such a lengthy period would ensure that those inhabitants who 
endured the invasion would not be subjected again to Argentine rule during their 
lifetimes* In addition, the time period would allow for new generations to be 
raised with the knowledge that they are Argentine citizens (in addition to their 
Island citizenship), so the loss of British administration would not be so 
shocking* The Islanders who support leaseback also want a long lease to ensure 
that Buenos Aires" commitment to democracy and human rights is genuine and 
enduring*
The Argentines advocate a shorter lease, along the lines of the Panama 
Canal treaty, of about 20-25 years* The Argentines have grown tired of British 
dilatoriness and are anxious to have the Islands by the end of the century or 
shortly thereafter* Said President Alfonsin, "We would like this return to take 
place during the lifespan of our gene rat ion *"^
The solution would be to compromise at 50-60 years* This would allow 
sufficiently for a generational change in the present Islander population and 
would offer an adequate period to judge Argentina's commitment to democracy* 
Argentina undoubtedly would object, but if this was presented as a 
take-it-or-leave-it proposition, they would probably acq iesce* After all,
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their main goal of achieving sovereignty would he realised immediately*
Further, Britain would be making the largest sacrifice—surrendering 
sovereignty—and, consequently, can expect an element of compromise on 
Argentina's part.
The British View of Leaseback
Support for leaseback exists among all three concerned parties. While the 
Thatcher government is not now supportive of leaseback, her government seriously 
contemplated the option at the beginning of her administration. In November, 
1980, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Nicholas Ridley, 
visited the Falklands to discuss options for the Islands' future, including 
leaseback. The response of the Islanders and the House of Commons to this visit 
and the leaseback proposal was rather unreceptlve. While the House of Commons 
was vociferously opposed to the idea, the extent of Islander opposition was 
exaggerated by their advocates in Parliament. Noted the Franks Committee in its 
Investigation of the 1982 Campaign, "it would be tragic If the Islands' chances 
of escaping from economic blight were to be diminished by the attitude of their 
champions at Westminster.”^  Since the conflict, many in Britain have become 
more anxious to find a viable long-term solution to the Anglo-Argentine dispute 
which will end the exorbitant diversion of Britain's limited financial 
resources. To the British, leaseback is appealing because it resolves both the 
self-determination and the sovereignty questions. Noted the Foreigh Affairs 
Committee in 1983,
The option of leaseback remains the most elegant solution of all, 
for It combines the principles of British administration with the 
immediate Introduction of the principle of notional Argentine 
sovereignty.
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Some In Britain oppose the idea of forcing the Islanders to either accept 
Argentine rule or leave the Islands, albeit with financial compensation. But, 
the sentiment in Britain is changing—the interests of the British nation cannot 
continue to be subordinated t the wishes of 1,800 Islanders. Even as a 
government has the right to build a highway on one's land, as long as adequate 
compensat ton is made, so the British can give the Islanders a choice between 
accepting leaseback or being compensated to leave the Islands. As British 
citizens, the Islanders can no longer expect to dictate a foreign policy which 
is adverse to the best interests of the entire British nation. Noted one Member 
of Parliament, "Just as British public opinion is changing, so too might that of 
the Islanders.
Islander Opinion on Leaseback
Islander opposition to leaseback, although still strong, is decreasing, 
especially among the younger generation which will be most affected by the 
implement«ition of a leaseback arrangement and the subsequent transition to 
Argentine rule. Even at the time of Ridley's visit in 1980, significant support 
for leaseback existed: one estimate even suggested as high as 50% supported
leaseback at the time. Those who originally objected to leaseback became even 
more vociferous in their opposition after the Argentine invasion; their worst 
fears, It seemed, had been confirmed. Still, many of the Islanders oppose any 
form of Argentine rule at all and would rather ! the Islands than join 
Argentina, regardless of the guarantees arranged for the maintenance of their 
way of life. Said one Islander, "I do not believe that were a leaseback to be 
imposed.•.there would be a viable community left in the Islands. 1 believe that 
most people would leave."^
The Argentine Approach to Leaseback
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The Argentines have shown great interest in the leaseback option, mainly 
because it provides immediate recognition of sovereignty, albeit without 
administrative rights* Recently, government officials have been giving deep 
consideration to leaseback* In a February interview with La Razon, the 
President of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Adolfo Gass, expressed 
support for leaseback "because that would Imply recognition of our 
sovereignty."^ Beyond that, the Argentines have expressed a willingness to 
amend their constitution to create a special status for the Falklands and Its 
inhabitants within Argentina* They have also expressed support for a treaty of 
guarantee to ensure the Argentines would not renege later on their promises to 
Britain and the Islanders.^
Conclusion: "The Way"
Leaseback combined with a buy-out option for Islanders opposed to the 
change in their status represents the most viable solution to the 
Anglo-Argentine dispute over the Falkland Islands* The Dependencies, on the 
other hand, should be placed under the Antarctic Treaty* Unlike status quo 
options or Internationalization, this plan addresses both the Issues of 
self-determination and the sovereignty dispute* At the same time, leaseback 
enjoys significant support from all three concerned parties: Britain,
Argentina, and the Falklanders* As bitterness over the military campaign fades, 
the desire for a concrete solution to the dispute will Increase and leaseback 
will appear as one of tbe most practical options, Increasing Its appeal* In 
reference to the Angio-Aregentine dispute, President Alfonsin commented in a 
note to Margaret Thatcher after his inauguration that "Where there Is a will, 
there is a  way*" Clearly, the way exists—leaseback best meets the demands and 
protects the interests of involved parties* The problem now Is waiting for the
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will to emerge—for Britain and Argentina to recognize that cooperation and 
compromise, not rhetoric and obstinacy, are the keys to a just and lasting 
resolution of their protracted, bitter dispute over the Falkland Islands*
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